Sign Up for ASP Alerts This essay is part of the ongoing American Security Project series, Iraq: Lessons Learned. Read more essays in this series here.
By Robert D. Hormats
February 13, 2008
A central lesson that should be learned from the war in Iraq is that a successful outcome requires both overwhelming force and a compelling political strategy that forges strong international and in-country alliances. The two must go together.
In the first military exercise this nation undertook—putting down the Whisky Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania in 1794—Alexander Hamilton advised President Washington that, although there were few insurgents, the federal government should send a massive force of 13,000 men. He argued that, “Whenever the government appears in arms, it ought to appear like Hercules.” This “Hamilton Doctrine,” which preceded the “Powell Doctrine” by two centuries, was invoked by Washington at the time and the insurrection melted away. Neither President Bush nor Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld similarly invoked the Powell Doctrine, and we have seen the consequences. 
In Iraq, the U.S. also failed on a second count—to implement a comprehensive political strategy. The coalition was a pale version of the one assembled to fight the first Iraq War: no Middle Eastern or Muslim nations, few European nations, and no financial support from anyone else. And our leaders failed to forge an effective political strategy to shore up support among key communities in Iraq. An effective outreach strategy in Iraq, backed up by considerably greater numbers of troops to protect Iraqis and their economic infrastructure, could have improved chances for success and held down the number of American and Iraqi casualties.
Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized during World War II that winning a modern war depends not only on massive force but also on the application of considerable political and diplomatic skills—building and holding together a strong international coalition and working closely with in-country groups after the war to establish a solid and durable peace. These profound understandings were crucial to success in the greatest war in American history. Planning for the Iraq War ignored these powerful historic lessons.
Less bravado, better planning, more troops, an effective alliance and a sounder strategy for garnering domestic allies in Iraq to forge a stable peace would have significantly improved U.S. prospects.
Robert D. Hormats is Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs (International) and a Managing Director of Goldman, Sachs & Co. He served as a Senior Staff Member for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council from 1974-1977, Ambassador and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from 1979-1981 and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1981-1982. Mr. Hormats' numerous articles and publications include the recently released book, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars from the Revolution to the War on Terror.
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