• Commentary: Strategic Realism and Georgia
• Conflicting Interests in Colombian Justice
• Taliban Launches Attacks in Afghanistan
• Pakistan’s Uncertain Future
• American Reflections on the End of Musharraf’s Rule

The Center for American Progress has a new version available of its measure of elite opinion of the issue of global terrorism, The Terrorism Index.  Among the many interesting findings are:

• A significantly less pessimistic view of the “war on terror,” with 21% of the experts now saying the U.S. is “winning” compared with only 6% last year.  More generally, the percentage of experts saying that the world is becoming safer for the United States has increased from 2% to 15%.  These are still very pessimistic assessments, but the change is dramatic.
•  Basically, Iraq completely fell of the table in terms of expert concern, with zero experts believing that Iraq is the “single greatest threat” to U.S. security (down from 10% last year) or that Iraq is likely to become the next al Qaeda stronghold (down from 22%).   The rapidity of this change is a bit unsettling and suggests a strong “echo chamber” effect within elite opinion.
• On the other hand, concern over Pakistan increased dramatically, with 51% of their respondents seeing it as the most likely future AQ stronghold.
• There was also very strong support for drawing down forces in Iraq and refocusing them on Afghanistan.
• 65% (!) of respondents were “unsure” about whether the United States should take military action to kill senior AQ leaders in Pakistan even if the Pakistani government refuses to give permission.  This is really extraordinary.  This is unquestionably one of the biggest foreign policy dilemmas the United States faces today and nearly two-thirds of experts are unable or unwilling to make a judgment one way or the other.

As always, this annual study is an interesting experiment, though what it really demonstrates is open for debate.  Foreign policy experts ultimately form a small community — even across party lines — and it is likely that a certain degree of groupthink causes expert opinion to lag behind developments initially and then overshoot the significance of developments when change does occur.

• Commentary: Al Qaeda on its 20th Birthday
• Georgia Conflict Highlights Potential of Cyberattacks
• DIA Gets News Counterintelligence Arm
• New Spy Regulations Would Make Domestic Surveillance Easier

• Bush Administration Recalls Cold War, Questions Moscow’s Aggression
• Unprecedented Reliance on Private Contractors in War
• First Arab Head of State Visits Baghdad
• Exit of Georgian Troops from Iraq Opens Border to Iran
• North Korea to Remain on List of State Sponsors of Terrorism

• Gates Says Fighting Terrorism Military’s Priority for Decades to Come
• CIA Confronts Pakistani Intelligence Over Militant Links
• Al Qaeda in Iraq Leader Believed to be in Afghanistan
• Rand Report Faults “WOT”, Emphasizes role of Law Enforcement over Military
• Bush Order Overhaul of Intelligence Aparatus

• Pakistan Planning to Push into Tribal Areas
• Conflicting Views of the Utility of More Troops in Afghanistan
• Afghan Opium Sector Makes Gains

• Bush Administration May Leave Al Qaeda Entrenched
• Terrorism Becomes Routine in India
• Concerns that Funding for DHS is Leaving Others Short
• Jihadist Training Camps in Pakistan

• UK Planning Withdrawal from Iraq
• Mullah Rahim Surrenders, Abdul Rasaq Killed
• George H.W. Bush and Former Advisers Warn Against Threats to Iran

• In Jordan, Construction as Anti-Extremism
• Shifting Policy Toward ‘Axis of Evil’
• Buses Bombed in China
• Limited Food, Water Forcing Tough Choices in the Middle East, North Africa
• ETA Bombing in Spain
  
• UK Can No Longer Rely on US Assurances on Torture, Panel Reports

From the NYT: Comment Stings Iraqi Leader on Eve of Obama Visit

This is the second time that the Bush Administration has pressured the Iraqis to “clarify” what seems to be a pretty clear sentiment.  They want us to set a timetable for withdrawal, a timetable that looks an awful lot like that which is being proposed by Senator Obama.  Once the Iraqis made their views clear, the matter ought to have been settled, but the Bush Administration does not seem to want to accept it.  Why?

The strategic argument is flawed.  At this point, there is nothing more to achieve militarily.  The Iraqi military is not a particularly effective force, but it is certainly capable enough to deal with the residual threat posed by the remains of al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups.  The Iraqi army is not capable, however, of disarming all the large sectarian militias.  But that is a political task and not a military one, and it is in any case not a task that the United States ought to assist in.  There is no benefit for the United States in being a kingmaker among domestic Iraqi factions.  If we aspire to any  role in Iraqi politics, it should be as an honest broker.  But the honest broker role is not a military one and does not require military force.

The safety of the troops argument is flawed.  Some worry that withdrawing American forces too rapidly will threaten the safety of American troops.  It is true that in military operations, redeployments are particularly risky times.  But those are cases where there is an opposing force ready to take advantage of it.  At this point, our forces are not taking casualties due to the concerted efforts of enemy army, they are taking casualties from opportunistic attacks on roads and mortar attacks on fixed facilities.  Our casualties in Iraq are now purely a function of time spend on the ground.  The longer we stay, the more casualties, the faster we get out, the fewer.  This does not mean by itself that we ought to leave faster of course, but it does suggest that there is no good troop-safety argument for an even slower withdrawal than in being currently proposed.

Ultimately, the case for not setting a timetable has to do with the end goal.  The Administration and its allies believe that a long-term American presence in Iraq would stabilize the region and help contain Iranian influence.  They don’t want a timetable because they don’t want to leave.  Ever.  That is a naive position, as it is both politically untenable and strategically vacant.  And yet, it is, in fact, the current policy of the United States.