CIA: Al Qaeda Off-balance
CIA director says secret attacks in Pakistan have hobbled al-Qaeda – Washington Post
Those operations are seriously disrupting al-Qaeda. It’s pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a very difficult time putting together any kind of command and control, that they are scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run.
If targeted killings have knocked al-Qaeda off balance in the short term, so much the better. However, a strategy based primarily on using missile strikes to keep al-Qaeda on its toes and running forever is one that is not likely to prove sustainable in the long run. In addition to being costly in terms of resources and attention committed over time, an indefinite tactically-oriented kinetic approach (i.e. missile strikes) has the unfortunate potential consequence of generating civilian casualties that deepen resentment locally, regionally, and internationally. Though using missile strikes might be the best available option in the short term, over time this can make the flow of recruits and ideological sympathizers to AQ’s associated movements worldwide more difficult to effectively stem.
Panetta alludes to the fact that though AQ’s ability to conduct sophisticated, large-scale operations may have been significantly degraded, pressure on AQ has likely not eliminated the possibility of smaller-scale attacks conducted locally and abroad. This is largely because, since 9/11, al-Qaeda as an organization has decentralized and splintered to a certain extent, spawning a number of regional affiliate groups and individual terror cells that may in some cases draw inspiration from AQ central but, in general, plan and operate autonomously. Though some of these groups and individuals are active in Afghanistan and the parts of Pakistan where AQ’s core leadership is thought to be hiding, others are seeking refuge in some of the world’s many other ungoverned and poorly governed spaces, operating clandestinely within western countries, or both.
Some of these terror cells and groups have a primarily local or regional focus, and many of them have been trending more toward that direction in the past two years. Others, however, with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) being perhaps the prominent example, have demonstrated a willingness to conduct attacks outside of their base of operations against the U.S. and its allies. For some of these attacks, such as the failed Christmas Day bombing attack in late 2009 and Najibullah Zazi’s plot to bomb the New York City subway system, there is little evidence that AQ-affiliated groups and individuals obtained operational guidance from al-Qaeda’s core leadership.
Putting al-Qaeda’s core leadership on the run and its disrupting its ability to plan attacks on the U.S. and its allies clearly makes America safer and is a good thing. It is critically important, however, that one not confuse a tactical approach designed to disrupt al-Qaeda’s planning and operational capability in the short term with a strategy for defeating the organization, or the violent jihadism in general, in the long run.
