Is Humanitarianism an Enduring Tool for Public Diplomacy?
As owner of the world’s most influential defense apparatus, America is often able to project its national values of service and generosity through the technological and logistical capabilities of its military in times of international need. With few public relations successes abroad from traditional military missions of late, the DoD has begun to explore other options to win the figurative “hearts and minds” of foreign populations.
Unlike the State Department or former United States Information Agency (USIA) abolished in 1999, the armed forces’ central vehicle available to “influence” foreign nations and citizens is the use of force. Possibly due to the contrasting messages of lethal force versus humanitarian aid, US military relief overseas often has a positive effect on foreign public opinion for only a limited period of time. Strategies aimed to sustain temporary achievements in foreign opinion regarding US involvement abroad should be actively pursued by policymakers.
A recent article highlights the potentially higher rate-of-return on investment in service of public diplomacy objectives by using DoD funds for humanitarian missions. The author suggests that despite the relatively low price tag on medical care provided by the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific region – only $20 million annually – this spending allows the United States to exercise a form of soft power often forgotten in traditional overseas defense operations.
The Asia-Pacific pivot reflecting the priorities espoused in the DoD’s 2012 Strategic Guidance Document will establish a roughly 60/40 majority dispersal of naval vessels in the Pacific. Though the strategy mainly guides distributions of equipment and manpower, the projected resource allocation creates opportunities for US armed forces to conduct humanitarian relief in highly populated and less-developed Asian nations. A mobile Pacific naval force has the ability to be responsive to civic and military matters, as well as natural disasters, while upholding the overarching vision espoused by the top US defense officials.
Certainly the moral importance of humanitarian aid cannot be discounted in improving the health and livelihood of foreign populations, even outside the scope of national security. Nonetheless, past indications are that future humanitarian efforts by the military, in a vacuum, will have only a limited lasting effect on the way America is perceived abroad.
The past two major humanitarian undertakings by the defense community involved relief efforts following the Japanese earthquake in 2011 and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. While public opinion data in the aftermath of Operation Tomodachi remains incomplete due to a small data set, the 19% one-year spike in America’s positive image in Japan – from 66% to 85% from 2011 to 2012- almost surely reflects Japanese appreciation for American aid following the disaster.
Public diplomacy advocates in the State and Defense departments should closely monitor this data in the future, as Indonesian opinions in the wake of the 2004 tsunami may be the true measuring stick for humanitarian effectiveness. In Pew’s poll gauging perceptions of how much America values a nation’s interests, Indonesia’s perception as recorded in 2005 – the year after the tsunami – climbed a staggering 34 percentage points from the previously recorded data.
Over the next six years however, Indonesians’ opinions of American considerations slowly leveled off. Though the data pertaining to major public diplomacy objectives is limited, the precedent set by the Indonesian relief effort indicates that humanitarian aid may not be an effective long-term policy tool on its own.
In his white paper on The New Public Diplomacy Imperative, ASP’s Matthew Wallin discusses the proper aims of humanitarian relief. Though public diplomacy can be a supplemental factor, the primary goal should be improvement in the conditions of those afflicted by tragedy. As the US exercises its resources to achieve that goal however, there are unique opportunities to forge new relationships where an American presence may have been nonexistent.
The Navy’s plan to garner cooperation from regional partners in the Pacific is undoubtedly wise, but simply allocating larger chunks of defense budgets for humanitarian missions alone may prove to be a misguided strategy. Relief efforts can serve as the figurative “icebreaker” with foreign populations, but continued cooperation and relationships beyond the immediacy of relief aid – perhaps in conjunction with the State Department – are necessary to facilitate lasting results on the public diplomacy front.
Though many debt reduction strategies call for decreased foreign involvement, a sustained American diplomatic presence is far cheaper and less obtrusive than prolonged military engagement. Global perceptions of the US as a partner or enabler, rather than a self-interested actor, are contingent on the lasting commitment to sustainable development.
