Negotiations in Afghanistan
A smart take on the negotiating with the Taliban from Gilles Dorronsoro:
Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Coalition strategy in Afghanistan has reached an impasse: tactical successes will not defeat the Taliban while Pakistan offers sanctuary, nor can security be “Afghanized” by a government that lacks legitimacy and is irreparably unpopular. A less costly—both in lives and money—and more effective option would be a negotiated agreement with the Taliban that paves the way for a unity government.
I think he’s largely right, though I disagree with many of his specific recommendations:
To begin negotiating with the Taliban, the coalition should:
- Involve Pakistan: Pakistan must be included—as the intermediary to the Taliban—even at the expense of India’s involvement. Pakistan is the only country in the region that is a potential spoiler in the process.
- Establish a cease-fire: A cease-fire during the negotiation process would demobilize the Taliban and distance them from radical groups like al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.
- Work around Karzai: The coalition should negotiate directly with the Taliban. The president is too weak and cannot make a commitment on key points, including the withdrawal of Western troops and security guarantees relating to al-Qaeda.
- Mobilize NGOs: A new constitution will need to be written to create a unity government and it will inevitably be more conservative than it is today. To prevent backsliding on human rights, particularly for women, the coalition must encourage NGO involvement in the process.
I think he’s too willing to bypass Karzai on this and rely on Pakistani intervention. But on the other hand, he knows Afghanistan better than I do. But still let me lay out my concerns.
My preference would be to let Karzai set the pace on this. He has already stated a willingness to reach out, and has been met by Taliban gestures as well. So, why bother turning this into a coalition/Pakistan show? The problem with making this a coalition show is that U.S. political pressures will make any settlement with the Taliban difficult to swallow. We’d be much better off in a Geneva 1954 situation where we could disavow the results, even if wink wink, nod nod, we’re willing to accept them. Similarly, I just don’t know that we can trust the Pakistanis to serve as an honest broker. It isn’t that I distrust the Pakistanis per se, but rather that it is not clear to me that the Pakistanis have any internal consensus on the issue. If you make the Pakistanis central to the process, I think you are inviting potential spoilers to the table (as Dorronsoro notes)… which may make sense, but needs to be thoroughly considered. But either way, getting to some sort of agreement with Pakistan on the terms of a potential settlement could take years before you even get to the point of having Afghans talk to Afghans. An Afghan-centric process, with a sidebar U.S.-Pakistani discuss strikes me as a better option. Parallel processes, with at least some formal ways to inject inputs back and forth.
Also, I guess I wonder about about the notion of establishing a cease-fire…. It seems to me that military pressure helps negotiation by altering the balance of forces on the ground, although clearly it gets in the way of good will. A way to balance the two would be to (a) continue clearing areas of insurgent military strength, but (b) cease attacks on insurgent leadership targets. I think that gets you the best of both worlds.
Anyway, I disagree with Doronsoro on some key issue of tactics, but I think he’s clearly on the right track as a strategic assessment. This is not a war we can “win.” So we need to find a political solution, which clearly offers more to insurgents than their opportunity to lay down their arms and pledge loyalty to the existing government.
