ASP President Vice Admiral Lee Gunn Addresses the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Security and Climate Change
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Washington, DC – Today, the President of the American Security Project (ASP), Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.), testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the national security implications of climate change. Admiral Gunn specifically detailed how climate change will lead to agricultural and water shortages, migration of climate refugees, and weakened states that will breed extremism, as well as the economic and military implications of these changes if no action is taken. Admiral Gunn also announced the formation of a special ASP Initiative dedicated to analyzing the military and security implications of these changes, as well as educating the general public on these repercussions.
Admiral Gunn’s full written testimony, as submitted for the record, is below:
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to share my assessment of the national security risks facing the United States because of changes expected in the Earth’s climate.
I’d like to say a few words now and submit a lengthier statement for the record.
Mr. Chairman, this committee’s attention to the national security implications of climate change adds an important piece to the public debate—a piece that, in my opinion, has been missing for too long.
Addressing the consequences of changes in the Earth’s climate is not simply about saving polar bears or preserving the beauty of mountain glaciers. Climate change is a threat to our national security. Taking it head on is about preserving our way of life.
I know that there remain some who are still not convinced by the science of climate change. I am convinced. Many remain to be persuaded by science that humans are at least contributing in important ways to the warming of the globe. I am not in that group either. But leaving aside the merits of the science, permit me to offer this observation from my 35 years of service in the United States Navy: threats and risks never present themselves with 100% certainty. By the time they achieve that level, as General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, has observed, something bad will have happened on the battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, something bad is happening already in our climate. Something worse will happen if we don’t act with urgency—as a nation and as a global community—to meet this threat.
The consequences of climate change will be found, and are being found now around the world. New climate conditions will lead to further human migrations and create more climate refugees, including those who cross our own borders. The stress of changes in the environment will increasingly weaken marginal states. Failing states will incubate extremism.
In South Asia, the melting of Himalayan glaciers jeopardizes fresh water supplies for more than one billion human beings. In North America, agriculture could be disrupted by increases in temperatures and shifting weather patterns that limit rainfall. Globally, major urban centers could be threatened by rising sea levels.
Malaria and other tropical diseases are moving into new areas and outbreaks are increasing in frequency as the planet warms and weather patterns change. As America debates climate change, its effects threaten to undo the good work in fighting malaria which has benefited from this committee’s leadership.
All of this is just the foretaste of a bitter cup from which we can expect to drink should we fail to address, urgently, the threat posed by climate change to our national security.
* * * *
I am here today as the President of the American Security Project—a bipartisan initiative that, more than a year ago, identified climate change as one of four principal national security challenges in the 21st century.
But the American Security Project is not the only group of national security thinkers and operators concerned with the threat posed by climate change. Since retiring from the Navy, I have served as President of the Institute for Public Research at CNA. CNA is a not for profit analysis and solutions institution heavily involved in helping leaders understand and deal with complex operational and public policy issues.
In 2007, CNA organized a Military Advisory Board composed of 11 retired generals and admirals (Admiral McGinn has reported/will report on that Board’s views) who concluded unanimously that climate change poses a serious threat to America’s national security. They saw changes in the Earth’s climate as a “threat multiplier” for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, while also adding to tensions in regions whose stability we now take for granted.
In 2008, the final National Defense Strategy of the Bush administration recognized climate change among key trends that will shape U.S. defense policy in the years ahead. Additionally, the National Intelligence Council completed its own assessment last year of the threat posed by climate change.
The national security community is rightly worried about climate change because of the magnitude of its expected impacts around the globe, even in our own country.
* * * *
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, it is easy to get lost in abstraction when we talk about climate change and national security. I’d like to reduce this to specific and practical defense implications. A changing and uncertain climate will, in my view, demand we adapt to new conditions affecting:
* – Why we apply our nation’s power (in all its forms), around the world,
* – How and where specifically our military is likely to have to fight,
* – The issues driving alliance relationships (and whom are we likely to find on our side on the battlefield).
Why We Apply Power
Climate change will force changes in “why” the United States fights, gives aid, supports governments, provides assistance, and anticipates natural and manmade disasters. It will do so because climate change threatens unrest and extremism as competition for dwindling resources, especially water, spreads. Weak or poorly functioning governments will lose credibility and the support of their citizens. Under these conditions, extremists will increasingly find willing recruits.
In particular, climate change will certainly expand the number of humanitarian relief and disaster assistance operations facing the international community. America’s men and women in uniform will be called on increasingly to help in these operations directly and to support the operations of legitimate governments and non-governmental organizations alike.
How We Fight
Climate change will force change in how we operate our forces around the world; changes will effect ground operations and logistics as well as operations at sea and in the air. Sea level rise threatens large investments in U.S. facilities around the world. Desertification and shifts in the availability of water can change logistic patterns drastically for all our forces.
The British Indian Ocean Territory, the island of Diego Garcia is a critical staging facility for U.S. and British naval and air forces operating in the Middle East and Central Asia. It sits just a few feet above sea-level at its highest point. Rising sea levels may swamp Diego Garcia and deny the United States this critical operating hub for its armed forces. There are myriad other examples of contingencies for which our national security team must prepare.
These challenges are not insurmountable. But they will be expensive to address and have to be thought through carefully lest they impact readiness. In any case, confronting changes in the military’s operating environment and mission set may lead to somewhat different decisions about U.S. force structure, in my opinion. Consider that it takes 20 or more years to build a new aircraft for the U.S. Air Force or Navy and that Navy ships are designed to last 30 to 50 years. With these extended time-frames, a basing structure secure from threats posed by climate as well as more traditional foes is a real national security consideration. We must anticipate new and revised missions for our military forces and factor those into our calculations of the consequences of climate change for America’s national security.
Alliances
The Arctic is a prime example of how alliances will be forced to adapt to the realities of climate change. Just a few years ago, the scientific community was predicting that the Arctic wouldn’t be ice-free until the middle of this century. Now the predictions put that date at 2013; just four years from now.
In the Arctic, the loss of sea-ice has caused concern in the U.S. Navy for nearly a decade. What naval planners know is that loss of sea-ice at the North Pole has the potential to increase commercial and military activity by other powers. As if we needed any evidence of this, look no further than the 2007 expedition by Russia to plant its flag in the sea-bed at the North Pole. Not surprisingly, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the United States—all nations bordering on the arctic—responded critically to Russia’s actions.
New climate conditions, new geographic realities, changes in economic and commercial circumstances, and pressures of migrating populations; all will test old alliances. Some changes may create new international friendships that will depend on America’s ability to help smooth the turmoil associated with those changes. Supporting other nations’ successes will continue to be an important part of our military’s role in U.S. national security.
* * * *
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, we at the American Security Project have also thought about the regional impacts of climate change on our security. I would like to submit some of our ideas about the security implications of those regional effects as part of my written statement for the record.
I would like to close with one final thought:
Climate change poses a clear and present danger to the United States of America. But if we respond appropriately, I believe we will enhance our security, not simply by averting the worst climate change impacts, but by spurring a new energy revolution.
It is for all of these reasons, taken in their totality, that the American Security Project will be launching a major initiative in the coming months to analyze and educate the public about the national security implications of these threats. We will be convening national security and climate change experts from around the country, we’ll be talking to corporate leaders who see the business case for action, and we will be working hard to continue the work you’ve already begun to educate the general public on the dire consequences of inaction.
This spring a second CNA Military Advisory Board (covered more completely by one of its esteemed members, Admiral McGinn) reported on a year-long consideration of energy and security issues. The report, entitled “Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security,” suggests strongly that national security, linked to energy security and economic growth, which undergird all of our nation’s power, can be achieved by taking action now to avert the worst consequences of climate change.
The imperative, then, is for leadership and action on a global scale. The United States must act. The United States must lead.
North Africa and the Middle East
Projected climate change will have a significant impact on North Africa and the Middle East primarily as a consequence of diminished access to fresh water. The region is already very vulnerable to water shortages and droughts. Poor subsistence farmers will be hardest hit, but for countries already struggling with rapidly rising populations and lagging economic growth the broader impact will be significant. Projected rises in sea level could also displace millions in the Nile river delta.
The region is already home to large, powerful, and sometimes violent radical movements. Corrupt and illegitimate governments face a great deal of public discontent. Climate change will exacerbate these dynamics, making the region even more prone to violence and increase the risk of the development of radical groups willing to use terrorism to pursue their interests. The nexus between authoritarian regimes, radicalism, violence, and climate change will play an important role in politics in the region over the coming years.
World climate change is projected to make the hot North African and Middle Eastern regions even hotter. Summer temperatures in Northern Africa are predicted to increase by as much as 9°C in the 2070 to 2099 period. A 1-4°C increase is expected through most of Northern Africa and the Middle East before 2020. The Indian Ocean is expected to both warm and rise affecting coastal countries such as Egypt and major water inlets including the Nile and the Ouergha watershed in Morocco.[1]
Humanitarian Impacts
Rising sea levels will affect cities on ocean coasts and major waterways. If the Mediterranean water levels increase by the conservative estimate of 30 centimeters, over 2 million people (and up to 4 million people) will potentially be displaced by 2050 in the Nile delta region.[2] This environment-forced migration coupled with economic migration due to decreasing crop yields is a strong precursor for a humanitarian disaster.
An increase in temperatures will mean an overall decrease in fresh water sources and an increased need for agricultural irrigation. Climate change will thus negatively affect the availability of fresh water used for drinking, proper sanitation, and hygiene. Reduced access to fresh water will mean a decline in overall health and an increase in disease.
Economic Impacts
Outside of the gulf region, poor rural areas are dependent on subsistence agriculture to feed families and earn a small living. In Egypt, 85% of their total water resources go to agriculture—which contributes to 20% of GDP (Jordanian and Israeli agriculture sectors take up 70 and 50 percent respectively of water resources and make up less than 10 percent of their GDP).[3] [4] Future water shortages will hamper economic development. The heavy reliance on agriculture by the rural poor will further increase the likelihood of instability. Palestinians are in particularly dire straits with 30% of their GDP dependent on an already heavily exploited water source—one that is the only source of drinking water for those living in Gaza.[5]
Climate conflicts
Countries in the region, already frequently unstable, are quite vulnerable to disruptions. Conflict between ethnic, religious, and political groups (at the regional, national, and sub-national levels) is rampant and easily triggered. Additionally, popular dissatisfaction with current corrupt and inept regimes continues to be an underlying threat to the stability of individual nation states. Climate change acts as a threat multiplier. Countries already under severe economic and political duress are likely to prepare and respond to crises poorly. Water shortages and rising sea levels will stress government capacity. Many countries in the region, particularly Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories are likely to suffer seriously in the near-term from climate change. Internal unrest from increased unemployment, a decrease in food supplies, and domestic migration is likely in countries. International conflicts over resources, due to migrants, and/or as a means of distraction are not only likely, but likely to exasperate the underlying climate change problem.
Water is already a scarce resource with the Middle East considered the area subjected to the most “water exploitation.” An increase in temperature would mean an increase in water needed for the crops and a decrease in crop output. Egypt and Libya are particularly at risk with their current water exploitation ranging upwards of 90%. Countries such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan are also susceptible to changes in water availability and increased temperatures.[6]
Tenuous water agreements exist governing the division of surface and ground water resources between countries—where given their history it is a surprise any agreements exist at all. The Nile Basin is shared between ten countries and water issues are dealt with by institutions established under the Nile Basin Initiative (which has now moved beyond the allocation of water). Similarly, Jordan and Israel have a long standing water sharing agreement that has for the most part remained strong, whereas Syria and Jordan have frequently renegotiated their water allocation agreement and discussion between the two on the topic is contentious. Israel has no water-sharing agreements or treaties with Syria or Lebanon (30% of the Sea of Galilee is in the Golan Heights) and water agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have not been updated since the Oslo II accords.[7]
Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa are dependent on large amounts of water to support their agricultural sector—dependent on their agricultural sector to support their economy—and dependent on the economy to support the regime. A lack of water threatens the security of many of the countries in the region as well as the stability of the region as a whole.
North America
Projected climate change will affect the security of North America primarily through the second-order impact of migration from Central and South America into the United States. The result will be continued stress on the United States’ southern border, which is already a conduit for drug trafficking, human smuggling and gang violence.
Climate change poses a significant risk to Mexico which is already vulnerable to political instability due to its rapid population growth, poverty, and government corruption. In the United States and Canada, there will be significant disruptions of agricultural patterns and threats to low-lying areas due to rises in sea level. As a leading power, the United States will also feel the consequences of climate change by virtue of its global reach and interests.
The broad span of geography, weather patterns, and income in North America makes it hard to make any generalizations about the effects of climate change in the region. Heat and precipitation levels are expected to rise across North America with the exception being the south-west US and the Canadian prairies—which are predicted to see decreased precipitation in their already dry climates. Warming between 1 to 3 degrees Celsius during the 2010 to 2039 time frame is expected to be particularly noticeable in the winter—when there will be a considerable reduction in the amount of snow and ice. This will affect water accessibility in the spring and summer when the built up snow and ice typically melt.[8]
Humanitarian Impacts
Rates of cardiovascular disease and respiratory diseases are expected to rise and grow in severity as increasing temperatures aggravate underlying health conditions and act as a symptom multiplier. Water- and food-borne diseases are also expected to become more common as warmer temperatures (and increasing amounts of precipitation in some areas) increase the ease with which these diseases spread. Higher incidents of dengue fever are already noted in regions of Mexico where climate change has meant increasing temperatures and precipitation.[9]
Economic Impacts
Climate change is expected to positively affect food production in the United States and Canada, while negatively affecting production in Mexico. U.S. and Canadian agriculture markets are known for their versatility and ability to adapt. The transportation sector could be negatively impacted due to climate change as bad weather and natural disasters increase delays and cancelations. Most at risk are environmental habitats in the two regions that host a wide array of flora and fauna and support the lifestyles and livelihoods of indigenous communities.
General infrastructure in Canada and the United States is strong and generally built to withstand threatening weather conditions, although they are certainly not infallible as Hurricane Katrina proved. Increases in extreme weather conditions such as hurricanes and flooding, will strongly affect regions already susceptible to these events. Insurance rates will dramatically increase—when home and business owners are able obtain it—and frequent major disasters could do serious damage to financial and insurance sectors.
Climate & Security
Although relatively stable, Mexico’s political system is less solid than that of its northern neighbors. Due to the economic and political situation that exists, some internal unrest should be expected from food increasing in price and decreasing in availability. Experts predict that Mexico will see a decrease in crop yield. More “tortilla marches” like that of 2007 are likely due to predicted decreases in income for agricultural workers coupled with the rising prices of foodstuffs. Mexico does not have the infrastructure to withstand serious weather crises. With over 25 percent of Mexico’s population below the poverty line, an equal percentage working in agriculture, and a poor distribution of wealth in the country, a decrease in crop yields could cause political unrest.[10]
Migration within Mexico and abroad to the United States as a result of declines in agricultural productivity is also a foreseeable security concern. These climate migrants (or economic migrants) cause stress to the communities to which they migrate, including adding additional environmental stress in the region and possibly exasperating the effects of climate change on areas more moderately affected. Mexico’s agricultural situation is not however as dire as that of the Middle East. The country can benefit from methods used and aid provided by the United States and Canada to help stave off some of the worst effects.
Australia and New Zealand
Projected climate change will have a limited impact on Australia and New Zealand. Rising temperatures will increase the spread of desert terrain in Australia, which will have a significant impact on rural communities and will particularly affect indigenous populations. More significantly given that large portions of the population of Australia and New Zealand live in coastal areas, rising sea levels will increase the risk of coastal erosion and the vulnerability of coastal areas to extreme weather.[11] The costs of retrofitting coastal infrastructure to function in a changed world will also be significant.
The temperature in Australia and New Zealand has already increased by 0.5° C since 1950. There is also a noted increase in the frequency of heat waves, changes in average precipitation, an increase in the intensity of droughts and a rise in sea levels by nearly three inches. Extreme weather events are projected to become more frequent and snow and frost less so in the future.
Humanitarian Impacts
Water shortage problems in southern and eastern Australia and in parts of New Zealand are expected to reach a critical point by 2030. Fresh water quality may also decline in Australia enough so that the decline in precipitation creates an increase in salinity, which makes the water unsuitable for drinking and irrigation.
Indigenous communities, which make up 15% of New Zealand’s and 2.4% of Australia’s population, will be hit the hardest. Typically living in rural areas and at a lower standard of living, indigenous people, who rely heavily on their local ecosystems, will have difficulty adapting to climate change. Smaller Asian-Pacific islands are expected to similarly be affected, which may mean an increase of migrants from the small islands to Australia and New Zealand.
On the bright side, diseases sensitive to climate change (such as malaria and dengue fever) are not expected to substantially affect the overall population, assuming public health standards remain high. Annual energy demand is also not expected to be affected by climate change—with warmer winters balancing out warmer summers.
Economic Impacts
Economic losses are expected to be high from the natural weather disasters brought on by climate change. The amount of damage will likely be exasperated by the heavy development of coastal areas that are more susceptible to rising ocean waters and storms. Current infrastructure requirements are thought to be increasingly insufficient as natural disasters spurred by climate change become more frequent and severe. Coastal areas are at particular risk—significant particularly because 80% of the Australian population lives in coastal areas. Further economic losses can be expected due to a decrease in tourism because of the decrease in biodiversity in major tourist destinations.
Climate and Security
Climate change will not directly affect the security of Australia and New Zealand. However, climate change issues surrounding infrastructure vulnerability and indigenous populations need to be addressed and are significant domestic political issues.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Projected climate change will have a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Africa. Already home to the most vulnerable populations in the world, climate change will exacerbate poverty, increase the spread of disease, and overwhelm the limited governance capacity of many Sub-Saharan African states. State collapse, massive refugee flows, and increased conflict – both between countries and within them – will be more and more common.
Over the coming decades, Sub-Saharan Africa will likely be subject to three significant environmental transformations. First, we will likely see an increase in mean surface air temperature of between 3 and 4°C by the end of the century.[12] Second, rainfall patterns will change appreciably, with some increase in rainfall in tropical and eastern Africa, and a dramatic decrease in southern Africa of as much as forty percent. Third, the number of extreme weather events is likely to increase with more years of drought as well as increased tropical cyclone activity originating in the Indian Ocean.
Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world. More than 50% of the population – or nearly 400 million people – live in households with an income of less than $1.25 per day.[13] Poverty rates are slowly declining, but the situation of most individuals below the poverty line remains dire. Most of the poor rely on subsistence agriculture, much of it on marginal land, to survive. Governmental capacity also remains very low. Only South Africa ranks above the 50th percentile mark in World Bank governance effectiveness indicators.[14] Many Sub-Saharan African societies are already stressed by disease and civil conflict making any worsening of conditions potentially devastating.
Humanitarian impacts
Climate change will increase the spread of disease, increase the number of people exposed to the risk of starvation, and increase the likelihood of violent civil conflicts. All of these are likely to contribute to severe humanitarian crises throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty and conflict will also spawn millions of refugees with the attendant hardships associated with such population displacements. Changing disease vectors will also increase the number of Africans at risk for deadly and debilitation diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and dysentery.
Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by low government capacity. Climate-induced economic stress will further diminish government capacity just as the challenges are increasing. As the gap between government capacity and societal needs increases, it is likely that political instability will result, particularly in societies already divided along ethnic and tribal lines. Poor governance further inhibits economic growth, creating a vicious cycle that may lead to state collapse. Virtually every state in East and Central Africa are ranked at high risk for state collapse by the Fund for Peace in their annual “Failed State Index.”[15]
Economic impacts
Climate change is predicted to have a devastating impact on the already weak economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Some countries are likely to see crop yields drop by as much as 50% due to unavailability of water or general worsening of agricultural conditions. The impact on the agricultural sector economically will be severe, with some countries seeing net revenue drop by as much as 90%.[16] Many subsistence farmers will starve and those who survive will see their ability to produce surplus for trade diminish dramatically. The cost of adaptation to increases in sea-level could also amount to 5-10% of GDP for countries with significant coastlines.[17] Climate change is also altering disease vectors, increasing the risk of the spread of malaria which has a debilitating impact on large numbers of people, further strangling economic growth.
Climate conflicts
Africa may witness some classic “resource” conflicts, particularly over water. But a more significant risk is violence stemmed from either state collapse or inter-communal disputes. Studies have shown, for instance, that the Rwandan genocide was most severe precisely in those districts where population growth and soil erosion had reduced farm sizes to below subsistence levels. Climate change will bring stresses such as this throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. [18]
Europe
Projected climate change through this century is expected to pose challenges to the security of European states and governments, mainly because of the indirect impact of the migration of people especially from the Middle East, Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africa.[19] Migration will be spurred by water shortages and the impact on agriculture and economy in these regions. Most of this migration from North Africa and Turkey is likely to be oriented towards southern Europe, an area expected to bear the brunt of climate change in Europe including water shortages and increases in malaria and dengue fever.
The stress of the direct impact of climate change on lives and economic well-being and of the second-order impact of migration will prove most challenging to coastal areas, and southern European states, especially in the Balkans, many of which are relatively new democracies that have strained relationships with neighboring countries. Southern Europe will experience higher temperatures and drought, while mountainous areas will face glacier retreat and reduced snow cover. The result for southern Europe as well as mountain areas will be decreased tourism with its expected negative economic impact.[20]
Humanitarian Impacts
35,000 deaths in 2003 were associated with one heat wave, affecting in particular the large number of at-risk elderly in Western European states.[21] Increasing numbers of heat waves will lead to loss of lives and increase stress on health care providers and facilities. Tropical diseases, including the increased risk of malaria and dengue fever in Southern Europe, will lead to deaths and suffering.
Economic Impacts
Climate change will affect the continent’s economy significantly. Agriculture will move northward so southern states, such as Spain, will suffer economically. The European Union is already beset by significant tensions over agricultural policy, and adjustment to climate change will increase tension and likely lead to significant expenditures on subsidies and other forms of transfer payments in order to mitigate the consequences of climate change.
Climate change will also affect the insurance industry. Insurance claims related to climate change will increase due to sea-level rise, and, in southern Europe, increased forest fire risk.[22]
Climate and Security
Climate change will increase social tensions within and between European countries because of large migrations from Africa and Turkey. The rise of nativist political parties and movements, many with radical or isolationist tendencies, will stress the abilities of these governments to serve as constructive global partners of the United States bilaterally or within multinational organizations.
Significant climate-induced refugee flows from Muslim countries will increase the risk of clashes between these marginalized and isolated immigrants and the rest of society. Economic changes, increasing numbers of migrants from North Africa and the Middle East, as well as alienated pockets of the population will provide additional opportunities for recruitment by radicals and pose a domestic terrorism risk for European states.
Central and South America
According to the IPCC’s most recent assessment, changes in climate and “highly unusual weather events” have already negatively affected Latin America and, with further warming from 1-4 degrees Celsius expected, more will follow. The direct human and economic costs of climate change to Latin America will be serious, especially in the Andes and the Caribbean regions. Climate change here is expected to bring more frequent and harsher hurricanes with associated flooding and loss of life and property, drought from disappearing glaciers, and increased rates of mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. Heat stress is expected to cause coral reefs to die, which will increase coastal vulnerability to storm surges and reduce fish habitats, and therefore, the amount of fish available to communities who rely on fishing related economic activities. The receding of the Amazon rainforest resulting from the change in weather patterns will reduce the Earth’s capacity to retain carbon, and will disrupt precipitation patterns in the region.
In this part of the world, poverty levels are high, economic development overall is low and the population is strongly dependent on subsistence farming. Many governments will struggle to provide for their citizens as well as cross border migrants in addition to the other domestic security strains caused by climate change.
Humanitarian Impacts
The humanitarian consequences of climate change in Latin America will be relatively limited, though vulnerable populations in over-populated areas will bear the brunt of the consequences. Subsistence farmers will continue to farm marginal lands, leading to a vicious cycle where environmental degradation promotes activities that worsen the crisis.
Increasing sea levels and more frequent and intense hurricanes will also lead to the potential loss of lives. Increased risk of malaria and dengue fever will lead to deaths and suffering, although a drier climate in countries such as Colombia will decrease the risk posed by these diseases in some places.
Economic Impacts
Climate change will affect food security. Drought and receding glaciers will result in lower agricultural productivity, in a sector that comprises about 10 percent of the region’s GDP.[23] Drought will be a problem in Peru and Venezuela, as well as Mexico and northeast Brazil. It is also likely that there will be some loss of productive agricultural land due to saltwater intrusion into freshwater and soil. Latin America’s fisheries will be further damaged by heat stress, which is causing coral reefs — host to 65 percent of all fish species in the region — to die. Heat stress will also cause the sea-level to rise and negatively affect mangrove ecosystems and protective habitat for fish and crustaceans.[24] [25] In addition, there will be further stress on the region’s water resources and water supply as glaciers recede.
Climate and Security
Internal migration is expected to be seen from rural to urban areas. These urban areas are poorly suited to absorbing rural migrants and lack the necessary infrastructure due to poor urban planning. Migrants will increase the spread of disease and further strain already over-burdened urban resources likely fueling internal unrest in the region and increasing class tension.
Democracy in Latin America remains a fragile institution. Climate stress is likely to increase the risk of the rise of popular authoritarian leaders or the return of military juntas as states struggle to meet the financial and governance challenges of dealing with a changing climate. We can also expect to see increased resource conflicts as states seek to preserve access to water and contain the effects of environmental degradation.
Asia
Projected climate change could have serious and destabilizing impacts on Asia from projected sea level rise that is very likely to result in coastal flooding which would result in a million displaced persons in South and Southeast Asia, as well as increases in cholera, malaria and other diseases. The effects of climate change may jeopardize the development and stability of parts of Asia. Tensions among states over water, especially in South Asia are probable, given that Himalayan glaciers – the Earth’s third largest ice sheet – are likely to continue melting, resulting in a dramatic reduction of water supply for much of Asia, especially Pakistan, and large parts of China and India.
Most significantly, the sea level rise associated with climate change will result in people from South and Southeast Asia migrating. Bangladesh is of particular concern with millions of its citizens expected to flee to India. These migrations, and the strain of providing for a sudden influx of immigrants, will cause tension between countries and within them.
Humanitarian Impacts
Flooding will result in the loss of lives and displacement of people in low-lying areas in South and Southeast Asia, and especially, Bangladesh. Tens of millions people live in these vulnerable areas, which have already been subject to devastating floods.[26]
Reduced food production will be a particular problem for the Indian subcontinent where most of the world’s growth in food demand is occurring.[27] The risk of hunger will be high.
Diseases such as cholera and malaria, especially in South and Southeast Asia will result in death and illness to a still greater extent than is currently the case. (The global burden of climate change attributable to diarrhea and malnutrition is already the largest in Southeast Asia).
Economic Impacts
Climate change will result in significant economic losses. Water scarcity will result in lower levels of agricultural output throughout much of Asia. For South Asia, where the Himalayan glaciers are receding faster than any others in the world, the major rivers – Ganga, Indus and Brahaputra – are likely to become seasonal rivers, which will have an impact on agriculture and the overall economies of the region. Meanwhile, changes in oceanic circulation and loss of coral reefs due to warmer water will result in a decline in fishery production in the coastal waters of East, South and Southeast Asia. (The Asia-Pacific region is the world’s largest producer of fish.)
The cost of damages from floods, typhoons and other climate-related hazards will likely increase in the future. The cost of direct damage from tropical cyclones in Asia increased about 35 times from the 1970s to the early 1990s, and flood damage increased about 8 times for the same time period.[28] In Northeast Asia, the frequency and extent of forest fires are likely to increase.
Climate and Security
South Asia is already a dangerous area for global conflicts. India and Pakistan remain locked in a decades long confrontation, and both sides continue to build up their nuclear arsenals. Violence by extremists on both sides of the border as well as in Afghanistan continues to destabilize the region. According to the United States Marine Corps’ publication, Flashpoints, an annual survey of future conflict, the top ten countries at risk for instability and the risk of conflict over water include Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.[29] Violence between Indians and Bangladeshi immigrants is likely as millions of Bangladeshis flee from their flooded country to India. India is already building a fence to keep the Bangladeshis out, and Hindu nationalists can be expected to use the influx of the Muslim Bangladeshis to stoke religious tensions for political advantage.
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[1] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 443-445.
[2] Freimuth, Ladeene, Gidon Bromberg, Munqeth Mehyar, and Nader Al Khateeb. Climate Change: A New Threat to Middle East Security. Prepared for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, Bali: EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth Middle East in special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, 2007, 21.
[3] (Parry, et al. 2007, 425).
[4] (Freimuth, et al. 2007, 14)
[5] (Freimuth, et al. 2007, 9)
[6] (Parry, et al. 2007, 441-442).
[7] (Freimuth, et al. 2007, 11-12)
[8] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 626.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Viniegra, María Eugenia Ibarrarán, and Salimah Mónica Cossens González. “Climate Change Research and Policy in Mexico: Implications for North American Security.” Politics and Policy 35, no. 4 (December 2007): 684-701.
[11] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 520.
[12] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 443.
[13]The World Bank. “Table 2.5 Poverty.” 2005 World Bank Indicators. 2005. http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm (accessed July 2, 2009).
[14] —. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2008.” Governance Matters 2009. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp (accessed July 1, 2009).
[15]”Failed States Index Scores 2007.” The Fund for Peace. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366 (accessed June 30, 2009).
[16] (Parry, et al. 2007, 435)
[17] (Parry, et al. 2007, 453)
[18] Diamond, Jared. Collapse. London: Viking Penguin, 2005, 311-328.
[19] The CNA Corporation. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” Alexandria, 2007, http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf , 20.
[20] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 556.
[21] (Parry, et al. 2007, 563)
[22] (Parry, et al. 2007, 557)
[23] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 584.
[24] (Vergara 2007, 2-3)
[25] (Parry, et al. 2007, 584)
[26] Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 481.
[27] The CNA Corporation. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” Alexandria, 2007. http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf , 24-27.
[28] (Parry, et al. 2007, 489)
[29] Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. 2008 Edition of Flashpoints. Quantico
