Conversation with a Jihadi Strategist

I can’t figure out how to summary or appropriately quote from this essay (Hotline to the jihad | The Australian), but it is a must-read.  First, a little background:

Leah Farrall is a former Australian intelligence analyst, now writing her dissertation on al Qaeda.  As she puts it:

In September, I rather cheekily requested a dialogue with a prominent Islamic militant. Egyptian-born Abu Walid al-Masri is a legendary figure in mujaheddin circles.
…
To my amazement, he agreed. For the past two months we have engaged in a dialogue, much of which has played out publicly via our respective blogs.

Some of the highlights of the resultant exchanges include:

In the process, we have discovered we agree on some things: most notably that al-Qa’ida has done its dash in the Islamic world. Abu Walid believes al-Qa’ida’s actions have caused more harm than good. The terrorism war, he tells me, has proven “to be far from the mood of the Muslim people and the result has been popular hatred towards it”.
….
He laments that “jihad has become synonymous with the explosive belt and the car bomb . . . and this is a real disaster because war is not indiscriminate killing”.

I think this is a realistic appraisal.  Public opinion polls show a severe drop off in support for AQ, even in Pakistan.  This is probably significantly a result of al Qaeda in Iraq’s brutality, but also the violence in Pakistan.

Here is another interesting bit:

In his most recent letter to me, where he responded to an article I wrote for The Australian on al-Qa’ida’s Afghanistan strategy, he dropped the loudest bomb of all. He tells me the Taliban will no longer welcome al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. Their return would make matters more complicated for the Taliban because “the majority of the population is against al-Qa’ida”.According to Abu Walid, the differences between al-Qa’ida and the Taliban are greater now than they were before the war. Not only is al-Qa’ida unwelcome in Afghanistan but so are other salafist groups who previously operated in the country.

I don’t know what to make of this.  Abu Walid could easily be engaged in disinformation.  But it is worth pondering the issue instead of just assuming that the situation is precisely the same as in 2001.  I’d also note, it isn’t clear to me that AQ would want to leave Pakistan.  It has been there longer now than it was in Afghanistan, and the family/marriage ties of AQ leaders is probably deeper in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.  Why uproot and return to Afghanistan?

More good stuff:

When I ask Abu Walid about negotiating with the Taliban, he replies with a quote by former US secretary of state George Shultz who said negotiations “are a euphemism for capitulation if the shadow of power is not cast across the bargaining table”.

The Taliban is all too aware of this. Omar’s statement last week addressed the issue and rejected coming to the negotiation table.

He said the “invading Americans want mujaheddin to surrender under the pretext of the negotiation. This is something impossible”.

I’ve made this point as well several times.  As long as we consider “negotiation” synonymous with reintegrating “reconcilable” fighters rather than as a process between equals, you can’t even hope for progress on that front.  I’m not sure we should pursue this path, but let’s at least be honest enough to speak clearly about what we mean by “negotiations.”

Abu Walid says the US is now trying to spread the shadow of power across
Afghanistan, but that it has already “lost its lead and lacks the will and capacity to win the war”.

It is an issue US President Barack Obama faces as he announces his decision on troop deployment in Afghanistan. A key element of his strategy will likely be the
projection of enough power to force the Taliban to the negotiating table.

Yup.  Obviously squaring that circle is the trick now.  I think the way to do it involves a credible threat to reintervene rather than a bluff about permanent occupation.  But I am in the tiny minority on that score.

Anyway, I have not done justice to either this essay, nor to the rest of the discussion provided by Farrall at her blog All Things Counterterrorism.  All I can say is that this an insanely valuable resource.