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Policymakers Must Respond Cautiously to Russia-China Joint Exercises A Tu-95 Aircraft Photo by Sergey Kustov
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Policymakers Must Respond Cautiously to Russia-China Joint Exercises

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On September 24th, 2024, two Russian missile carrier aircraft flew past the coast of Alaska while remaining in international air space. Four days prior, in response to joint Chinese-Russian military exercises off the Alaskan coast, the U.S. military began increasing its presence in that area. However, the United States must be careful in how it reacts to the situation in order to avoid potentially unintentionally triggering a larger conflict.

The desire to act decisively against the acts is understandable, but sometimes overinflated. Some politicians, such as Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan, consider these flybys “incursions” into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, this viewpoint represents a misunderstanding of the perceived aggressiveness of these foreign military activities. EEZs allow for the freedom of overflight and military exercises since EEZ airspace is considered international and not sovereign territory. Furthermore, America’s ability to cite such a maritime boundary demarcation is challenged by the fact it has never ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes EEZs. This should be rectified by Congress.

This recent Russian and Chinese joint military exercise is not the first time they have operated together near the United States or its allies. For instance, in July of 2024, U.S. and Canadian fighter jets intercepted Chinese and Russian bombers off the coast of Alaska. Additionally, on September 21, the two countries began conducting naval exercises in the Sea of Japan. Since the mid-2000s, the frequency and geographic range of Chinese-Russian collaborative drills has increased, and a spokesperson for China’s defense ministry claimed that the exercises were meant to improve relations with Russia.

Military posturing is nothing new to international relations. The United States itself has a history of conducting military exercises near its adversaries’ borders, so China and Russia behaving similarly should not necessarily be of great concern on its own. Comparatively, the exercises around Alaska are nowhere near as provocative in nature as the airspace incursions around Japan and Taiwan, or the “exercises” that led to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the exercises are emblematic of close ties between Russia and China, they are not immediately threatening to U.S. national security. Even symbolically, China and Russia’s ramping up of military exercises does not represent an enormous change to America’s national security situation for the time being. China and Russia have long signaled their mutual friendship, and with Russia’s military tied down in Ukraine it is unlikely that Chinese and Russian interoperability would matter in a hypothetical conflict with China.

America should thus balance its response to these exercises, as they present opportunities for strategic miscalculations with significant downsides. An overreaction to a routine or insignificant event could spiral out of control, as Chinese and Russian pilots are known to behave recklessly when given the opportunity. For example, in 2001, an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace off the coast of China was intercepted by two Chinese fighters making aggressive passes that resulted in a midair collision. The EP-3 was severely damaged and forced to land at a PLA naval base without permission, resulting in an international crisis and souring relations between the two countries. With the possibility of incidents like this in mind, America must therefore exercise extreme caution when reacting to Chinese and Russian aircraft operating near its own airspace, as the frequency of these events increases the likelihood of a pilot on either side making a mistake.

While operations outside of a country’s sovereign airspace are technically legal, the regular violation of sovereign airspace would qualify as gray-zone operations, as they exist in the space between complete peace and all-out war. Gray-zone operations are provocative but may not rise to the level of justifying a massive military response. They are often intended to distract an enemy, so that they are unable to determine what may or may not be a substantive threat. Russia, by flying aircraft near Alaska’s coast, is attempting to distract U.S. military capabilities away from critical areas by sparking fear in American policymakers and the public. The United States should be wary of compromising its military readiness in other potential theaters of war by diverting resources toward regions that are unlikely to see direct attack. With While these regions are important to Chinese national security, Taiwan has been of central importance since the end of the Chinese Civil War. China can hope to distract the United States from developing the defense of Taiwan by threatening U.S. treaty allies in the region.

The United States needs to focus its limited military resources towards issues of genuine risk, such as the ongoing land war in Europe, an escalating conflict in the Middle East, and ever-increasing tensions around Taiwan. Air space violations do need to be deterred, but the United States needs to remain cognizant that a direct attack by the Russian or Chinese military on the U.S. mainland risks a level of confrontation that neither country is likely to take. Policymakers must maintain a steady hand and focus on areas of likely conflict, rather than getting distracted by a couple of Russian or Chinese aircraft operating in international airspace.