A shipment from USAID in Sudan, Credit: USAID

The Sudan war intensified as the Sudanese military forces started their offensive on Khartoum in late September. The U.S. announced Tuesday, October 8^th, that it is sanctioning a senior leader of the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces, in order to taper off weapons supplies into the country. Meanwhile, 26 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, about 15,500 people have been killed in the last 18 months, and 10.7 million are internally displaced. Last month, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2750 to continue targeted sanctions against Sudan, including asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo, until September 12^th, 2025. Yet the fighting continues with no end in sight; projections estimate that by 2027, 6-10 million people could die of starvation. The peace talks held in August failed to produce results as neither of the parties participated. The mistrust is hard-wearing, and the fighting forces are still convinced the solution lies on the battlefield.

After the ousting of President Omar al Bashir in April 2019, the military took control of the country. Until 2023, Sudan’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Army Forces (SAF), and the country’s deputy leader, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, the head of a paramilitary organization called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), had been sharing power. However, their relationship started fracturing over the fight for political power, with violence erupting in Khartoum in April 2023, and both parties blaming the other for the outbreak. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia quickly initiated ceasefire talks, but the parties left the table in late May 2023. Since the breakdown of the peace talks, a complete civil war has broken out, and the RSF has had a firm grip on the capital of Khartoum and parts of Darfur. Widespread reports of ethnic cleansing against the Masalit tribe by the RSF, coupled with indiscriminate bombing raids targeting civilians by the SAF, highlight the atrocities committed by both parties. However, the glaring absence of accountability remains a significant concern.

Map demonstrating the military-occupied territories as of August 2024: The pink illustrates the Sudanese Armed Forces, and the green the Rapid Support Forces. The SAF is approaching Khartoum from the North as of September 2024. While heavy fighting continues in Al Fashir and Darfur, among other places.

The power struggle in Sudan has persisted for 18 months, driven largely by foreign interests in the country’s resources and strategic location. The Nile, running through Khartoum, is necessary for water, food, and electricity and is a point of contention between Sudan and its neighbors. The vast reserves of gold, oil, and gum arabic have long attracted outside exploitation, in addition to the strategic benefits of having a presence along the Red Sea coastline critical to global trade. Foreign actors like Russian mercenaries have supplied weapons to the RSF in exchange for resources, while China’s Belt and Road Initiative has provided the Sudanese government with over $143 million in loans, further entrenching foreign involvement.

Moreover, the Gulf states are pitted against each other in the hopes of gaining strategic influence. Since 2018, the UAE has invested heavily in the Hemedti-led Rapid Support Forces through financial aid disguised as humanitarian aid. Saudi Arabia has supported the Sudanese Armed Forces, anticipating that Burhan will safeguard Saudi regional strategic interests. Egypt holds the same hope by establishing the Neighbors of Sudan Initiative and providing drones and warplanes to the SAF. Iran and Türkiye have also thrown their hats in the ring with economic and diplomatic backing of the Sudanese government. In other terms, multiple stakeholders in the peace talks hold their thumb on the scale, making tangible results and an effective UN sanctions initiative unreachable.

The U.S. position on the case of Sudan so far has been that of a facilitator. The U.S. commenced initial ceasefire talks, and it remains the biggest contributor to humanitarian aid in the country, providing more than $1.6 Billion since 2023. Whilst simultaneously holding the door open for negotiations, President Biden addressed the UAE stance towards RSF in Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s visit to the U.S. in late September. The president must, however, maintain close relations with the Gulf states, relying on them to lead the negotiations in the ongoing crises in the Middle East.

To reach an agreement, all parties need to be incentivized to partake in multi-level negotiations, but it seems unlikely that the SAF or RSF will initiate it themselves. The U.S. and its partners could strongarm them by targeting their economic backers, though this risk pushing them closer to China or Russia and straining ties with Middle Eastern partners. Financially backing the SAF, albeit problematic due to Burhan’s ties to Bashir-era Islamists, could be an option.

At a minimum, the U.S. should provide more resources to its recently appointed special envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, and increase funding for the local employees of the Office of Sudan Affairs. Perriello has faced criticism from the Sudanese government for not being fully dedicated to the peace talks and for a lack of presence in Sudan itself. The critique might serve as a tactic by the SAF to deflect from serious negotiations, as Perriello himself pointed out, his efforts to visit Sudan were obstructed when SAF forces prevented his entry at Port Sudan. Nevertheless, increased resources could help Perriello and his team to generate more consensus on the issue and build strong coalitions on both a regional and international level. Second, while the creation of the Office of Sudan Affairs was a positive step, the State Department acknowledges that more work is needed to ensure it becomes fully operational. For instance, loyal local employees are essential for providing valuable expertise, fostering trust within civil society, and can potentially serve as peacebuilders in the event that negotiations progress.

In recent months, both the State Department budget for Sudan and the number of U.S. aid packages have increased, signaling a stronger commitment to the region. However, the UN’s 2024 goal of raising a combined $4.1 billion for humanitarian needs in Sudan remains critically underfunded, with only 5% of the target met by March. This lack of assistance hampers any meaningful resolution, and the U.S. should push those who pledged support. Failing to meet these objectives, Sudan will stand as a clear example of the U.S. and its allies taking the backseat in their Africa policies and ceding strategic ground to nations with far less favorable intentions.

Map of the Sudan conflict:

Credit:”Map of the Sudan War” of ElijahPepe, Click here for link, Click here for credit

Credit original version: “Location map of Sudan” of NordNordWest, Click here for link, Click here for credit

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