NATO defense ministers meet in Brussels on October 17th, 2024. Image Credit: NATO
How NATO Should Refine Its Russia Policy
On November 12th, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called on member states to continue supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia to “raise the cost for Putin and his authoritarian friends…” This comes after NATO defense ministers met in Brussels last month to discuss issues including aid to Ukraine. However, like Rutte’s recent speech, the meeting barely touched on the full scope of NATO’s relations with Russia. While the Brussels meeting referenced just one specific strategy, there are several actions that NATO should take to refine its Russia policy.
NATO’s diplomatic relations with Russia have degraded over time. After Putin’s 2008 military incursion into Georgia, meetings between the joint NATO-Russia Council (NRC) were suspended until the following year, and after Crimea’s annexation in 2014, NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia.
Following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, NATO has relied on several strategies to deter Russian aggression toward the alliance. One strategy that NATO has mentioned previously is nuclear training exercises, which Secretary General Rutte noted improve NATO’s nuclear capabilities. These exercises ensure that NATO members are prepared for potential conflict, which helps to deter aggression. Yet this strategy also has drawbacks. After NATO’s “Steadfast Noon” drill on October 14th, 2024, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov accused the alliance of fueling tensions amidst the already “hot” Ukraine war. Even so, these training exercises reaffirm the risks for Russia should it decide to act against NATO with nuclear weapons.
Though Rutte did not discuss them in his recent statement, sanctions are another measure that NATO member states use to penalize Putin and make it more difficult for Russia to produce military equipment. For instance, in February of 2024, the EU announced restrictions on commodities such as electrical transformers and drone components. In the first year of the war, Russia’s GDP shrank by roughly 2.1% due to sanctions. However, Russia has consistently bypassed these and other sanctions by importing and exporting sanctioned goods, including oil, through countries like Kazakhstan and Georgia.
Although Russia actively circumvents them, sanctions have stagnated the country’s economy to a point where its current annual GDP growth is 5% below what it would be without sanctions. Unfortunately, this impact is insufficient, considering Russia’s continuing gains in Ukraine. To improve sanctions’ impact, NATO members should develop a body or mechanism to coordinate the identification and implementation of new sanctions. Without an enforcement mechanism, NATO itself cannot directly implement sanctions, instead requiring member states or outside institutions to accomplish this. As the Royal United Services Institute notes, a coordinating body with the EU would provide a forum for sharing sensitive information regarding economic security and military component supply chains, thereby allowing NATO’s knowledge to tap the power of the EU’s leverage over trade. The coordinating body could ultimately increase cohesiveness and connectivity amongst the various sanctions-implementing structures that exist in member states to administer those recommendations independently, but in conjunction with a more united overall approach.
Yet unity is difficult, as it is challenging to get every member on board with sanctions plans. States like Hungary are known to block the EU’s requests, so other NATO members must rely on careful negotiation to assure coordinated implementation of sanctions. Navigating these roadblocks will require NATO and EU members to identify carrots that they can offer to less cooperative members to gain compliance, particularly as sanctions can have negative effects on the implementing countries. For example, as part of a deal to accept Sweden’s membership in NATO, the U.S. agreed to allow the sale of new F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.
Another item that Rutte did not mention is deciding whether to keep the long-standing Founding Act, which established peaceful relations between NATO and Russia. The act calls for cooperation in areas of common interest, including on defense-based economic projects, transparency, refraining from the threat of force, as well as broad political-military negotiations. In 1997, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin and leaders of the sixteen NATO member states signed the Founding Act after the Soviet Union fell and Russia became a fledgling democracy. While Yeltsin was displeased about cooperating with NATO, he signed the act because it was more politically beneficial to Russia than the alternative of a rapid NATO expansion. But just as Russia’s experiment with democracy rapidly declined, Putin has repeatedly defied the act with his aggressive behaviors, including in Ukraine and Crimea. He has also threatened NATO with war numerous times, such as in September of 2024 in response to delivering long-range missiles to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, it is in the best interest of certain NATO members, notably Turkey and Hungary, which continue depending on Russia for energy, to retain the act. Given the act’s facilitation of cooperation with Russia, Hungary and Turkey rely continuously on the opportunity, such as the agreements that they entered with Lukoil, a Russian oil company. Moreover, while it will be difficult for NATO to reach a unified stance due to members’ differing objectives, the alliance must come to a decision about this policy-defining agreement that has become obsolete.Ultimately, NATO will need a multilayered approach in order to have any hope of further containing Russia. Though hammering out a plan will be difficult due to conflicting interests, finding such a strategy is crucial in managing an aggressive Russia. Most importantly, NATO must be careful when determining its future course of action and consider all possible outcomes, including conflict with Russia. However, it is difficult for NATO to establish new policies given the forthcoming Trump administration’s ambiguous policy toward Ukraine. Trump must therefore clarify his Ukraine policy stance to not leave fellow NATO members in the dark about his plans.
Ultimately, NATO will need a multilayered approach in order to have any hope of further containing Russia. Though hammering out a plan will be difficult due to conflicting interests, finding such a strategy is crucial in managing an aggressive Russia. Most importantly, NATO must be careful when determining its future course of action and consider all possible outcomes, including conflict with Russia. However, it is difficult for NATO to establish new policies given the forthcoming Trump administration’s ambiguous policy toward Ukraine. Trump must therefore clarify his Ukraine policy stance to not leave fellow NATO members in the dark about his plans.
Image license: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/68162.htm
