Image credit: President of Ukraine
Preparing the Unprepared: How Europe Should Respond to a Potential U.S. Withdrawal of Support for Ukraine in 2025
As the new Trump administration prepares to take office in January 2025, uncertainty about the president-elect’s stance on support for Ukraine looms large. Meanwhile, the current administration is ramping up its military support, and the Kremlin is escalating the conflict with foreign boots and new weapons on the ground. In light of President-elect Trump’s pledge to end the war within 24 hours—potentially at Ukraine’s expense—European nations must urgently craft strategic policies to show that they are willing to stand behind Ukraine for the long haul, even if the U.S. is not. Spanning economic, military, and informational domains, Europe can insulate Ukraine while weakening Russia in order to invest in Kyiv’s bargaining position.
Defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity is paramount to deterring further Russian expansionism, but Europe remains divided. Slovakia and Hungary lean toward Russia, while Germany and France face domestic political opposition. Meanwhile, many Ukrainians favor peace talks, with around half supporting dialogue. RAND Corporation’s Michael Bohnert calculated that, without U.S. involvement, European NATO countries must contribute 0.5% of GDP annually to sustain Ukraine’s defense or double that to reclaim lost territory. Hence, enabling a decisive battle is out of the question, and Europe is left supporting a war of attrition: weakening Russia’s forces while maintaining Ukraine’s military strength short term and boosting its economic independence long term.
In this regard, the EU’s pledge to compensate the U.S.-led G7 initiative is merely a starting point, with the World Bank estimating Ukraine’s reconstruction needs at $411 billion. Yet, the devil lies in the details; the Russian economy is too, struggling to keep up with its war efforts, as revealed in the 2025 federal budget. To bolster Ukraine’s long-term resilience, European nations should therefore further invest in its military and civilian industries. This approach reduces the perceived credibility of Russian accusations of direct military intervention and allows Ukraine to produce its own weapons. Companies like Norway’s NAMMO, Sweden’s Saab, and Germany’s Rheinmetall have already begun establishing factories in Ukraine, accelerating its economic recovery and integration into the European market.
In the short term, however, Europe must swiftly shift its military strategy if it wants its long-term investments to pay off. Recent U.S. approval for Ukraine’s use of ATACMS against targets within Russian territory has added a layer of strategic uncertainty for Moscow, a tactic European allies can complement. The UK, France, and Italy have provided Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, but their stockpiles appear to be running low. To compensate, Germany could deliver Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missiles, supplementing the existing U.S.-made ATACMS for coordinated Russian-territory attacks. Striking targets within Russia forces it to spread its defenses, weakening the overall effectiveness of those defenses. In anticipation of the ATACMS delivery Russia moved about 90 percent of critical aircraft and offensive weaponry away from its range, and extended supply chains, emphasizing the ability of ATACMS to hamper Russia’s war machine. Germany, with up to 300 Taurus missiles, has hesitated to supply them, citing their advanced technology and long-range. Chancellor Schulz, positioning himself as ‘Chancellor of Peace,’ needs to calculate his costs: either go all-in on emboldening Ukraine’s position or risk losing Ukraine to Russia. The latter could result not only in forfeiting strategic territory but also empowers the Russian economy and military, bolstered by Ukrainian spoils, to continue waging war throughout Europe.
Furthermore, the enhancement of air-defense capabilities will be increasingly crucial without ongoing U.S. support, particularly if Germany contributes with more offensive weaponry. Non-U.S. NATO countries can adapt 2.75/70mm rockets into platforms like VAMPIRE to address drone and cruise missile threats. Likewise, strengthening the Latvian-led drone coalition with tactical strike drones would enable smaller European countries to provide essential elements such as cameras, flight controllers, and batteries. Larger missile defense systems, such as the SAMP/T, should be deployed to counter the rising number of Russian missile attacks observed this fall. Data on Russian missile and drone assaults from 2022 to today indicated that August 2024 was the peak month, with an average of 35.8 missiles launched daily, followed by a notable decline in September, possibly due to depleted stocks or successful long-range Ukrainian strikes. Evidently, should Ukraine ramp up its offensive efforts in Russian territory, a surge in counterstrikes must be expected and answered. While SAMP/T is not effective against hypersonic missiles, such attacks have thus far been restricted, and Russia is believed to have limited stockpiles. Innovation on how to counter these attacks, however, should be prioritized to stand against future threats, as already initiated by Italy and France.
While intensifying military support, Europe and Ukraine should launch a coherent counter-information campaign against Russia. As noted by Peter Pomerantsev, in domestic crises such as the Wagner uprising and the Kursk incursion, Russian public sentiment toward President Putin dropped by 10%, exposing cracks in the Kremlin’s information machine. A coalition of European countries and private entities should target social media, websites, and Russian agitators to challenge Kremlin narratives, highlighting economic hardships, and the consequences of prolonged war. By eroding public support for the Kremlin and weakening its alliances, these campaigns could complement military and economic efforts to isolate Russia.
In the months ahead, European strategic autonomy will face a critical test. Europe’s ability to support Ukraine will define its role in a world moving beyond a U.S.-guaranteed security framework, determining whether it succumbs to Putin’s expansionist agenda or stands firm as a defender of international law and territorial integrity.
