Compelling Analysis on al Qaeda
From Bruce Hoffman:
Al-Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one, too. – washingtonpost.com
Remarkably, more than eight years after Sept. 11, we still don’t fully understand our dynamic and evolutionary enemy. We claim success when it is regrouping and tally killed leaders while more devious plots are being hatched. Al-Qaeda needs to be utterly destroyed. This will be accomplished not just by killing and capturing terrorists — as we must continue to do — but by breaking the cycle of radicalization and recruitment that sustains the movement.
I’ll be writing a lot more about this essay in several fora, but some initial thoughts:
(1) Just because AQ has a strategy does not mean we have to counter it. We can’t get into the habit of simply responding to AQ actions. In this particular case, the proper response to much of AQ’s strategy is simply to ignore it. It is a strategy that requires us to respond badly in order for it to be effective, and since it is difficult to respond well, it might be better not to respond at all.
(2) The AQ challenge needs to be seen in two ways. One is as a terrorism threat, in which case focusing on counter-terrorism in depth is the right response. Passive defenses combined with limited disruptive actions is not only all we should do, it is all we can do. The bigger challenge has been AQ’s success at various times — waning before 9/11 and waning against today — to make itself synonymous with either Islamism or anti-Americanism. AQ’s success has been its ability to attach itself — leech-like — on to broad movements of discontent. To the extent that AQ — as per Hoffman — remains a dangerous terrorist threat, it is a problem, but manageable. To the extent that it part of a broader movement, it is a more than a problem, but rather a significant risk that takes on global proportions. Our primary goal must be to avoid turning a nuisance-level terrorist threat into a global challenge. And given AQ’s challenges over the past year or so, over-reacting is one of the greatest risks we face.
(3) As much as I respect Hoffman, this is a one-sided piece of analysis. I think it is a fair assessment of what AQ-central may be thinking, but it says little about actual capacity. Worse, it fails to take into account large adverse trends for AQ such as a the collapse of public support for AQ/UBL, the renunciation of AQ by LIFG, the decline of AQIM into petty criminality, the continued weakness of AQ-affiliated in SE Asia. Yes, the Yemen/Somalia situations are a major challenge, but they need to be weighed against other regional developments.
The 2009 edition of “Are We Winning?” provide a useful alternative to Hoffman’s interpretation.
