On Wednesday, USAToday published an article exploring the efforts to “win hearts and minds” in Afghanistan and Iraq. The authors, Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, did a fantastic job in gathering information on the cost and activities of the military and its contractors in pursuing “information operations.” This is a rarely explored topic that deserves a lot of attention as a key aspect of our overall “war winning” strategy.

The article reveals a great deal about how we have pursued our goals (or lack thereof) in conflict zones over the past decade. According to the article, spending on information operations reached upwards of $580 million in 2009, a number which may be staggering to professional public diplomacy practitioners. On top of that, exactly how that money is spent is not being disclosed, making it difficult to maximize its benefit.

More worrying than the actual dollar amount is who is spending it. For example, Leonie Industries, a company contracted to perform information operations for the military, was established in 2004 by a brother and sister pair who were previously involved in direct-to-video movies and advertising. It has received “at least $120 million in contracts in recent years.” Yet despite being involved with such a large amount of money, Leonie also neglected to pay for heating and medical care for its Afghan employees, until the Army “threatened to drop [its] contract.” How is it that the military trusts this company to help win hearts and minds?

Based on the information presented by Vanden Brook and Locker, the military appears to have a basic understanding of what many of the problems are with regards to communicating with foreign publics, but fails to understand how to connect all the dots to workable and effective solutions.

For instance, there is a general understanding that the U.S. lacks a certain amount of credibility when attempting turn minds in favor of its strategic goals. It understands that the messenger is important, but fails to understand that the message and the messenger must be on equal footing.

Rear Admiral Hal Pittman, who oversaw information operations in Afghanistan, is cited as stating:

“The honest truth is that because we are outsiders and not Muslim, we have a lower believability and credibility rating than people within the Afghan Government or Afghans.”

Pittman gets this only half correct. He correctly identifies the credibility issue of Americans, but falsely attributes the Afghan Government, which is rife with corruption, as having an effectively higher credibility rating. It may in fact be higher, but in absolute terms, it may still not be high at all.

Vanden Brook and Jackson rightly point out that “In Afghanistan, information operations campaigns are often used to bolster local officials, who are viewed with suspicion by many Afghans because of their ties to corruption.” Therein lies the problem.

If in the eyes of Afghans, both the U.S. military and Afghan Government aren’t credible messengers, what’s the best way to create a credible message in such volatile environments? According to the article, both the Pentagon and its contractors practice the dissemination of unattributed TV and radio content, posters, and billboards intended to counter Taliban propaganda, promote the Afghan government’s accomplishments, highlight the work of NGOs and recruit for the Afghan security forces.

There are several problems with this strategy. Though separating the message from the Afghan government and the U.S. military is an appropriate tactic, issuing completely unattributed messages fails to create a captivating narrative and identifiable branding. If you are trying to sell an idea, then you need to sell it. Give it a brand, give it a voice, and demonstrate why your option is better than the opposing narrative. Give people a choice. If necessary, give the idea to a third party, whether that’s an NGO or newly created organization that can establish and carry the narrative.

In a separate, but related article, Vanden Brook and Jackson note a 2008 effort by the U.S. Military to tap the popularity of Iraq Star, a hit show in Iraq similar to American Idol, by sponsoring it with pro-Iraqi-government messages. Though the plan fell through, it’s understandable why this was perceived to be a good idea, as there is value to tapping popular media in order to promote the maximum spread of a message. This is especially important given the inability of American-created media like Alhurra to generate a significant audience.

But in the case of Iraq, which has by all accounts struggled with unity and the ability to find a common voice of its own, Iraq Star was best left alone to thrive without outside interference. Iraq needed its own success story to survive on its own merits without being tainted.

Public diplomacy, strategic communication, or information operations — whichever label you want to give it — is suffering from a lack of professionalism. You cannot merely fill the communication vacuum with leaflets, advertisements and dollars. You must employ communication professionals who have the expertise to listen to and effectively understand their audience, comprehend the strategic goal, and can create material that resonates with the target audience. That is key.

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