[FLASHPOINT] Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program
By Michelle Tverdosi
Iran’s nuclear program has been all over the headlines lately—the U.S. and its allies are pressuring the UN to formally acknowledge that Iran’s program has included activities related to nuclear weapons, and IAEA Director Amano revealed the existence of new evidence suggesting the possible military orientation of the program—but this seems like the same old news.
The most interesting headlines come from Israel and the now-public conflict of opinions on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.
Former head of the Mossad intelligence service Meir Dagan, recently retired, has been in the news because of his outspoken views on the wisdom of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. He has said:
A military strike targeting Iran’s nuclear programs was “the stupidest thing I ever heard”.
An attack on Iran “would mean regional war, and in that case you would have given Iran the best possible reason to continue the nuclear program”.
These views emphasize Dagan’s view that instead of getting rid of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, a military strike would instead amplify Iran’s ambitions and substantiate the leadership’s belief that nuclear weapons are necessary in the current security environment.
Dagan’s public statements come not long after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke to a joint session of Congress, in which he spoke of the importance of maintaining the military option:
‘The more Iran believes that all options are on the table, the less the chance of confrontation,’ Netanyahu said.
Netanyahu has said before that Iran won’t curb its nuclear ambitions unless it thinks it is threatened with military action.
The perspectives of Dagan and Netanyahu both have their own appeal.
Dagan’s views speak to the importance of a rational, cautious approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear program—and it is certainly possible that something as bold as military action may exacerbate, rather than solve, the problem.
But on the other hand, Netanyahu’s perspective recognizes the importance of keeping many options open. Deterrence and coercion lose their effects if a potential adversary can accurately and confidently predict your reaction, so there is something to be said for having options that keep a potential adversary guessing.
The implications of this public conflict of opinion on Israel’s deterrence capabilities and its policy towards Iran have yet to be determined, but it will certainly be interesting to see whether Dagan’s statements change the direction of Israel’s policy towards Iran’s nuclear program in the future.
This is crossposted on the American Security Project “Flashpoint” blog…
