Conventional operations, a proven method of success

In short, because of the nature of American power, the vast majority of the benefits from conflict come early and relatively cheaply, whereas the pursuit of additional benefits is increasingly costly and subject to diminishing returns.

This is true of both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts where pivotal war aims were accomplished within weeks of the start of the wars.

(Iraq) By the end of 2003, the U.S. had removed Saddam Hussein from power and assured that the Baathist regime — personalized as an incipient dynasty as in Syria — could not be restored. The U.S. had ended Iraq’s support for terrorism — largely Palestinian terrorism, but terrorism nonetheless — and had assured that Iraq could not threaten its neighbors. The intervention had also ended Saddam’s human rights abuses, and by getting the U.N. sanctions on Iraq lifted had removed another significant source of human suffering in the country.

(Afghanistan) Military operations began roughly on Oct. 7, 2001. Kabul fell on Nov. 13, 2001. Tora Bora was captured on Dec. 17, 2001, and al-Qaida leaders were chased from the country. The remaining significant al-Qaida and Taliban forces in the country were defeated in hard fighting in March 2002. Within six months the Taliban had been devastated and al-Qaida was shattered.

What unearths a desire to participate in a drawn out conflict, Finel explains, is an unrealistic goal of diminishing future threats. Looking at the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, threats arise under occupation.

Insurgents have been able to build and deploy more than 80,000 IEDs while under occupation — calls into question the ability of occupying forces to root out terror networks. There is also compelling evidence that some terrorist networks, notably groups that carry out suicide attacks, are the result of military occupations rather than contained by such deployments.

However, significant threats to the U.S., ranging from the military capacity of regional powers to weapons of mass destruction development programs to significant terrorist infrastructures, can be targeted and destroyed by conventional military capabilities.

Simply stated, enacting a drawn out operation does not guarantee fewer threats. More forces have lost their lives, more money has been spent, and more troops have been deployed adopting the counterinsurgency method. It’s time we start employing methods with a proven record of success.