Simulation Suggests that Christmas Day Bomb Blast Would Not Have Downed Airliner
On Thursday March 4th, as part of its “How Safe Are Our Skies” documentary, the BBC showcased a controlled simulation that it commissioned to determine the level of damage and destruction that the Christmas Day airline bombing attack attempted by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab would have caused if executed successfully. The results of the experiment, which was conducted on a decommissioned Boeing 747 using the same amount and type of explosive used in the Christmas Day attack, showed that though the bomb would have killed Abdulmutuallab and the passenger sitting next to him had it been successfully detonated, it would have been unlikely to have ruptured or destroyed the fuselage of the aircraft. In describing the results of the procedure, the BBC quotes Captain J. Joseph, an air accident investigator, as stating that it would have required a considerably larger quantity of explosives to rupture the skin of the aircraft and compromise the pilot’s ability to fly or land the plane safely.
It is important to note that regardless of his bomb’s potential destructive power, Abdulmutallab’s plot clearly presented the type of threat that intelligence and law-enforcement authorities should make every effort to monitor, track, and disrupt well before it reaches the operational stage. It is of course critical, therefore, that law-enforcement officials and policymakers closely examine the range of counterterrorism policies and procedures that failed to prevent Abdulmutallab from boarding Flight 253 with explosives secreted on his person.
This study very effectively underscores, however, the importance and value of using a measured, evidence-based approach in assessing the threat that terrorists present so that policies and procedures can be calibrated accordingly. It is doubly valuable as a reminder to the American public that, though terrorist threats are very real and deserve to be taken seriously, those threats also deserve the kind of careful factual analysis that helps to determine their seriousness and scope. This assures Americans at every level of society that policies employed to protect the country are based not on fear-mongering, political posturing, or random shots in the dark, but in rational assessment of what threats we are facing and what actions can and should be taken to defeat them.
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The testing was done to simulate the bomb blast in the same conditions as that of the Christmas 2009 bombing attempt on a Boeing 747. The problem with using exact inputs to variables in this one-off test, is that any variation in conditions may give a different result, and the test gives a media-driven false sense of security by avoiding further tests and examinations of results. The test, as it was, on the ground, did not give a simulated result for situations where air pressure would be a relevant factor.
The new air-safety rules with restrictions on passengers’ mobility etc (such as being able to assemble devices in the toilet) now hinder a terrorist from detonating their bomb device when they are less than say an hour from touchdown (in that end period the Christmas 2009 attack occurred). Due to this American airline policy change, future detonations are being forced to be triggered at a greater height, where air pressure definitely will be a crucial factor in assisting to maximize damage levels. How easy it is to provide to the trusting public misleading conclusions from selected statistics and minimalist experiments. Poor science, you are misused and abused. You can cover a lot of portholes with whitewash.
To be clearer: Changes in airline policy now make it more difficult for terrorists to detonate their weapon when flying near to cities on their approach for a landing. This will now, however, ensure a greater success by terrorists in destroying aircraft than hitherto, when using the same or similar Christmas 2009 bombing types of weaponry. More success, as a detonation earlier in flights, at cabin-pressured heights, will intensify the impact of the small explosions, with much greater chances of destroying the planes and their occupants. There will be more fireworks in the sky instead of more fizzers. The airlines are going from shooting themselves in the foot, to interfering with the shooter and getting the gun, instead, pointed at their heart.
The terrorist’s failure in the Christmas 2009 bombing attempt was due to a fault in their own idea. Wanting to kill two birds with one stone: to destroy a plane with its load of passengers and also to crash into a populated area. They didn’t think it through; so now the hostiles are being assisted, against their wishes, to kill better by the very hospitality of airlines to ‘naively’ ensure the safety of their passengers. The terrorists don’t only have their friendly trainers overseas, they get training by the naivety of their enemy America. The CIA, meaning well, trained bin Laden. Now the airlines, meaning well, are training the terrorists by restricting the time-frame for terrorists to err.
In order to avoid detection, the terrorist weapon is small, limiting the level of explosive force that can be played with. In trying to achieve too much at once, the results of detonations would mostly be repeated fizzers. But now, terrorists will be forced to detonate their little bomb at a more effective time with cabin pressure assisting the expansion of the pressure of an explosion.
The test on a 747 on land, that so carefully simulated the conditions of the Christmas 2009 bombing, has mislead the security experts conducting the demonstration (who got paid for it), thence mislead the media (who paid for it), thence mislead the public (who will pay for it) into a false sense of security. That original set of conditions will no longer apply. With airline policy changes, all future detonations will now affect and be affected by cabin pressure, which before wasn’t necessarily the case. This assistance by policy makers to force the terrorists to now be more effective in their work, is an example of rushed and poor thinking. There can be now more downed aircraft, not less. From being uncomfortable in flying frying pans, to now jump directly into the fire. Those who are profesional thinkers and those who are appointed to be decision makers appear not to be one and the same people. Changing this state of affairs is one change that would have a useful effect on protecting the safety of citizens.