Enriching Uranium in Iran
While experts do not believe Iran has the intellectual capacity to manufacture the fuel rods required for its research reactor in Tehran as it claims is its aim, it is capable of making enough enriched uranium for a weapon “within six months or less,” states a March 3rd report from the Institute for Science and International Security. According to ISIS,
In a breakout scenario using low enriched uranium, Natanz could currently produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a weapon in six months or less.
How is this alarming rate possible? Uranium enrichment is a nonlinear process, meaning the input required is not equivalent to the output. Enriching higher grade uranium requires fewer centrifuges, of which Natanz alone houses 8,000. Its capacity is as high as 54,000.
So far, Iran has enriched enough uranium 235 for two atomic bombs from its natural state of .7 percent to 4 percent. This Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is certainly shy of the 90 percent required for weapon-grade levels, but the process to get from .7 percent to 4 percent is more cumbersome than, for example, enriching it from 4 percent to 20. Reports the New York Times,
A practical illustration of nonlinearity is that Iran — or any other nuclear hopeful — needs increasingly few centrifuges to make uranium 235 increasingly potent. For instance, one industry blueprint features 3,936 centrifuges for enriching up to 4 percent, 1,312 centrifuges to 20 percent, 546 centrifuges to 60 percent and just 128 centrifuges to 90 percent — the level needed for a bomb.
Iran has most recently received international attention for its decision to enrich its 4 percent stockpile to 20 percent. Admittedly, an Obama administration official states, Iran ‘“is heading more and more in the direction of seeking a weapons capability.”’
But perhaps this decision to enrich its stockpile internally is a political maneuver, an effort to escalate tension between Iran and the West. After all, experts point out, Iran is moving at a slow pace to create the fuel its reactor in Tehran depends on for power. Despite the fact that the reactor’s fuel supply is likely to run out within months, at the current pace, it will be five to seven years before the adequate level is available. Statements from the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also signal political posturing,
‘We have opened a window of opportunity for the others to prove their political will to come and to have a deal on the nuclear fuel.’
Regardless, ISIS writes:
If Iran succeeds in producing a large stock of 19.75 percent LEU, in a worst-case scenario, the [Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant] is large enough to turn this LEU into sufficient weapon-grade uranium for a weapon within a month.
