Four Reasons why the United States Should Not Attack Iran: Part I
This is the first in a four part series refuting arguments for striking Iran’s nuclear facilities.
This past week Niall Ferguson wrote yet another column downplaying the costs of a strike on Iran. Underlining his assertion is that diplomacy can’t work because the Iranian’s “revolutionary Shiite theocracy” is essentially a risk-seeking, extortionist and radical regime whose power would be exponentially increase with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This march to war is eerily similar to late 2002 and early 2003, when other academics played down the risks involved in Iraq and the Bush administration felt the United States would be met by flowers and open arms.
Nearly 10 years later, some nearsighted people are still pushing for strikes on Iran in the same way, by downplaying the risks and inflating the rewards. But under greater scrutiny; these points reveal a simplistic and superficial view of Iran’s worldview and foreign policy.
First, the argument goes; the Iranian threat of retaliation is hollow. They claim that American firepower in the Strait of Hormuz or Persian Gulf is overwhelming, which prevents Iran from effectively retaliating against shipping. But Iran will retaliate against a strike, just not conventionally.
Iran’s military disparity with the United States has forced the country to invest heavily in asymmetrical forces centered in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and their venerable Quds Force. Iran would deploy the IRGC’s significant naval forces trained and equipped for irregular warfare by using small boats and fast attack craft for swarming tactics, naval mines, and land-based cruise missiles to attack various targets in the Gulf and the Strait.
Iranian naval forces are most likely to use a “hit, run, hide, repeat” strategy that limits the effectiveness of US naval defenses built around defeating a conventional opponent. This scenario was put to the test in the classified 2002 Pentagon war game called “Millennium Challenge 2002”, where the opfor force lead by retired General Paul Van Riper, destroyed 16 major warships, including an aircraft carrier, to small-boat swarming tactics and cruise missiles.
By employing small boat tactics or cruise missiles to harass oil tankers or the US Navy in the Gulf or the Strait, Iranian forces can do significant damage to the roughly 14 tankers that transit the strategic choke point each day.
In addition to irregular combat in regional waterways, Iran would undoubtedly increase their military and financial support of Hezbollah and in the process, undermine Israel’s security, further isolate the Lebanese government, and broaden Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian crisis.
Hezbollah has thousands of Katyusha rockets that can shower Northern Israel and hundreds of longer range Zelzal rockets with the range to reach Tel Aviv. An Iranian retaliation against Israel would involve the use of these longer range rockets, transforming an antagonistic neighbor into a major threat.
An attack on Iran may also lead to increased Iranian support for the Afghan Taliban echoing Iran’s alleged support of Shiite insurgents during the Iraq War. Iran could provide training, Explosively Formed Penetrators to destroy vehicles, and money, making our difficult job in Afghanistan nearly impossible.
Just at the moment the United States is attempting to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, Iran could significantly increase their support, reducing the Taliban’s impetus for negotiations; allowing them to “wait out” the United States.
It is clear that strike supporters are wrong on this first point. The Iranians will not just sit on their hands after an attack on their soil, they will engage irregularly in their regional waterways, increase support Hezbollah, and increase their support of the Afghan Taliban.
