On Friday, the National Research Council of the National Academies released a report detailing the reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, U.S. and international monitoring capabilities, and U.S. technical capabilities under the CTBT.

The report concluded that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile for the foreseeable future, provided that sufficient funding and resources are provided to the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).  This means that the United States does not and will not require nuclear testing to determine the reliability of the current stockpile.

The report indicates that the current stockpile requires commitment and resources.  One, a strong scientific and engineering base that can assess and certify weapons, provides ongoing experiments, and maintains a non-nuclear explosion testing facilities.  Two, a vigorous surveillance program that can detect warhead problems quickly; three, modernized production facilities; and four, a competent and capable workforce that can meet the stringent requirements of nuclear weapons related work.

The report also concluded that the United States has a robust detection capability based on its National Technical Means (NTM) which is superior to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO) International Monitoring System (IMS).  Advancements in the CTBTO’s IMS have made it possible to detect an underground nuclear explosion (similar to the two detonated by North Korea in 2006 and 2009) well below 1 Kiloton worldwide.

Radionuclide and infrasound monitoring must continued to be supported and integrated, but both detection programs have surpassed expectations.  And finally, hydroacoustic monitoring has the capability to detect an underwater nuclear explosion above 10 tons worldwide and below 1 ton in most of the world’s oceans.

The report also says that the United States will not benefit from additional nuclear explosive testing due to the wealth of knowledge from past U.S. nuclear testing and the lack of other nations’, manly Russia and China, testing of nuclear weapons.  Neither Russia nor China, the report continues, are able to design and test new nuclear weapons outside the range of current detection thresholds.  And if some nations were to design new nuclear weapons, they would have to be tested in the mutli-kiloton range to determine the viably of a new design.  This test would easily be detectable with the current IMS and U.S. NTM.

To read the full report click here.

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