NATO Summit: Deterrence and Defense Posture Review
On Monday and Tuesday leaders of NATO countries met in Chicago for the 25th NATO Summit. A majority of the press coverage for this event has focused on the protests and NATO’s drawdown in Afghanistan. However, this summit was also the forum for the ratification and release of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR).
The DDPR was commissioned at the 2010 Lisbon Summit in order to assess “NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance…”
It was hoped that the DDPR would provide additional clarity and direction for the future of NATO’s nuclear policy and move away from the existing nuclear status quo. Unfortunately, the review lacked any substantive changes from the policies outlined in the Strategic Concept at Lisbon, nor did it attempt to resolve any divisive issues that confront the allies. However, the DDPR did provide updated information regarding ballistic missile defense and discussed the possibility of non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile reductions.
Regarding ballistic missile defense, the DDPR announced that “NATO has achieved an Interim Capability for its missile defense.” This status confirms the establishment of the necessary command and control procedures and the ability to provide real, albeit limited, defense against ballistic missile attacks.
The DDPR additionally notes, that “in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence, will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and, in accordance with NATO’s policy of engagement with third states on ballistic missile defense, engage with other relevant states, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.”
Regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, the DDPR states that, “[The North Atlantic Council] will task the appropriate committees to develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe.”
“NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia…”
The DDPR also plans, “to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.”
One can certainly applaud the DDPR for hinting at a future where NATO would reduce its reliance on non-strategic weapons and for expressing the desire to increase transparency and establish confidence-building exercises with the Russian Federation regarding ballistic missile defense and their mutual non-strategic nuclear weapon postures. However, while the DDPR outlines several significant goals, it fails to provide any substantive details on how it intends to achieve them. Therefore, it would seem NATO has once again deferred any difficult decisions to a later date.
