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NATO’s Current Course of Action Will Not Solve its China Problem
NATO recently accused China of becoming “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” marking the first time the alliance has issued such a harsh statement on China. This statement came during the Alliance’s mid-July DC summit, only weeks after Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, during which he and Kim Jong Un signed a defensive alliance. As China and North Korea’s respective roles in the war in Ukraine have become clearer, so too has the need to rebut their actions to effectively counter Russia. However, harsh statements on China and increasing NATO’s footprint in Asia with broader inclusion of the IP4 is not going to accomplish that goal. If NATO wants to get serious about cutting off Russia’s funding and war materiel, the United States, EU, and other allied states will need to work together to implement a well-researched, coordinated set of secondary sanctions.
China and North Korea’s support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine necessitate NATO’s increased consideration of Asia. Treasury Secretary Yellen said it herself, “Russia’s war economy is deeply isolated from the international financial system, leaving the Kremlin’s military desperate for access to the outside world.” With American and EU resources off the table, Russia has turned to states like China and North Korea for support. Indeed, Chinese imports from Russia have been increasing since 2021, something that the war in Ukraine has not changed. Moreover, China is providing Russia with dual-use goods, which are not themselves weapons, but are necessary for Russia’s production of weapons. Meanwhile, the defense pact recently signed between Russia and North Korea acts as a signal of closer relations between the two states, though North Korean-manufactured weapons were found to have been used in Ukraine as early as January of this year. Just days before the Russia/North Korea summit, the U.S. State Department estimated that over 11,000 containers of munitions had been provided to Russia by North Korea since September. Together, China and North Korea are providing both financial and material support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
This support poses a serious problem for NATO, and the Alliance’s actions intended to address the issue are misaligned with the goal. NATO’s purpose is to “guarantee the freedom and security of its members,” a goal which Putin’s war in Ukraine directly threatens. Removing Russia’s access to funding and war material would fulfill NATO’s obligation to its members, but doing so will not be possible without cutting off Chinese and North Korean support: Chinese exports to Russia increased by over 5 billion dollars per month from 2019 to 2023, and many analysts believe that China is keeping Russia’s economy afloat. Despite this, the only actions NATO has taken toward China thus far include issuing a harsh statement on China and strengthening its partnerships in Asia. China characterized NATO’s statement on it as being “filled with Cold War mentality and belligerent rhetoric,” and just days after NATO’s condemnation of the PRC, China and Russia began joint naval drills. NATO’s actions thus far have only served to encourage further Sino-Russo cooperation. Changing China and North Korea’s behavior will require more than criticism and stronger alliances in Asia—it will require finely tuned actions that directly influence the means by which those countries support Russia.
A better path forward would be a coordinated effort between the United States, EU, NATO, and allied economies to craft a set of coordinated, well-researched secondary sanctions. As of June, Chinese exports to Russia had only dipped twice, and in both instances, Chinese firms had reason to worry about the risks of sanctions. Further, the recent implementation of secondary sanctions targeting China by the United States did lead a number of Chinese banks to slow or halt transactions with Russian clients, and the volume of dual-use Chinese exports to Russia decreased by over 300 million dollars between December and April, suggesting that sanctions efforts may have had a real impact. Making it financially painful to support Russia is the best way to discourage non-NATO-aligned states from furthering Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. Admittedly, enforcing secondary sanctions on China would also be painful for the economies of the United States and its NATO allies. In 2022 alone, trade between China and the United States totaled 758.4 billion dollars. The U.S. economy is deeply intertwined with China’s, and sanctioning China in a way that would effectively change behavior toward Russia would impact the United States’ economy as well. However, congressionally approved aid to Ukraine currently totals almost 175 billion dollars; allowing China to support Russia also comes at a cost, and it is not one that the United States or its allies should be content to continue paying.
NATO has a legitimate reason to push back against China and North Korea for the support they are providing to Russia, but the actions NATO has taken thus far have not created that pushback. Simply strengthening alliances in Asia and issuing critical statements of China does nothing to put an end to the material support being given to Russia. If anything, the steps NATO has taken thus far have pushed China, North Korea, and Russia closer together: condemnations and increased involvement in Asia simultaneously offer no material punishments for supporting Russia and real reasons to feel threatened or upset by NATO Allies. Empty threats are only exacerbating NATO’s problems. Solving them will require coordinated economic effort by Allied states, an effort that would be difficult, but worthwhile.
