Revisiting "Least Bad" and Drones
Michael Cohen over that Democracy Arsenal considers drones a “least bad” option:
democracyarsenal.org: Drones: The Least Bad Option
The bottom line here is that there is no silver bullet to dealing with jihadist terror groups that operate in the wilds of Pakistan. If you think about the various policy courses that the US has adopted – encouraging the Pakistanis to deal with the issue militarily, escalate in Afghanistan to prevent an AQ safe haven from emerging . . . the drone war looks a lot better.
I’ve addressed the “least bad” issue in the past, and it is worth revisiting my arguments then:
BernardFinel.com » “Least Bad” in Security Planning
Let me make a few points:
(1) Least bad is certainly a legitimate decision rule, if you have correctly identified the full range of options and accurately specified the cost and benefits of each. It is, in short, a maximin strategy.
(2) It is never a perfect decision rule because you always need to explore whether your maximin rule actually a saddle point. If not, you need a more sophisticated approach that address expected utility and likely leads you into mixed strategies.
(3) No one using the “least bad” arguement is actually doing steps (1) or (2). What they are doing instead is, pardon my French, covering their asses. See, if you admit your recommendation is the “least bad,” you are claiming that your support is reluctant. You can’t really be held responsible for the recommendation, because, you know, you don’t really like the option, and in an “ideal world” you wouldn’t support. But being a “realist” you are forced to the conclusion in question.
(4) There are some decisions where “least bad” is not good enough. In some cases, I think you ought to try to make an affirmative case. Wars of choice are a good example. “Least bad” is not a sufficient justification for, say, getting into a war with Iran. It is also not a good enough justification for throwing ignoring deeply rooted norms and established laws.
(5) A lot of stuff only seems to be “least bad” because (a) people are too lazy to consider alternatives, and (b) the over-estimate the benefits of their recommendation and under-estimate the costs.
(6) Any “least bad” recommendation — and there are cases where I acknowledge they are inevitable — must contain a sense of strategic time. You want to be able to move from “least bad” to “best” or least “good.” So a “least bad” recommendation ought to always have an exit strategy, or a strategic transformation built into it. “Lease bad” is implicitly a time-limited argument.
As a general rule, we should minimize the reliance on “least bad” claims and be very skeptical of those making them.
I actually agree with Michael on drone attacks. Sort of. I think they are an effective short-term way of keeping pressure on jihadi groups, in a way that makes it more difficult for them to recruit fighters and plan attacks. It isn’t a “least bad” approach in the short-term, it is just the best option, and I think in the short-term, it is a net positive. BUT, and this is a big one, it obviously is not a long-term strategy for at least three reasons:
(1) The precedent is horrible. It is an unabashed policy of extrajudicial killings, and it WILL come back and haunt us. Any country facing any sort of terrorist threat is going to lot at our drone program and argue that they now have a right to track down and murder political opponents anywhere in the world on the basis of secret intelligence.
(2) Over time groups will adapt. There is a complex web of intelligence support that goes into target generation, but sooner or later, simply by virtue of evolutionary pressures, drones will becomes less effective against high-value targets. Note already that while we’ve been able to kill seven al-Qaeda “number 3s” we have not been able to get off a shot at bin Laden or Zawahiri. So drone strikes are a wasting asset.
(3) The public opinion consequences are disastrous. The issue is not whether we are actually killing civilians. And the issue is not even the perception that we are doing so. The issue is the reality that the United States is behaving as if it faced no international constraints. The drone strikes — and other SOF activities — are a reminder to all and sundry that the United States is a military colossus with no peer competitor and no limitations. It is a source of humiliation and insecurity, and it feeds into a set of pernicious arguments that essentially justify the use of force against Americans as a matter of self-defense. As I have argued many times, the main problem we face is not that we are perceived as weak, but rather than we are perceived as arrogant bullies. The drones strikes provide short-term tactical advantages at the cost of worsening out overall strategic position.
So while I sort of agree with the drone program, I also know it is only a short-term fix. The problem is that I don’t have a coherent long-term exit strategy. And as a result, regardless of short-term cost-benefit calculations, I am reticent about this recommendation. We’ve digging a hole with this program, and I think we’d better be sure we have a way out before we continue digging.
