Why now, again?

Though the specter of sequestration has been an impending reality on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon for months, multiple recent events have brought the issue closer to the public eye.

Recent media articles shed light on the issue once more, as the deadline for a White House OMB report slated to contain detailed analysis of the cuts under sequestration came and went last Thursday. Anticipation for the report’s release (now scheduled for late this week) coupled with the expected return of Congress from their summer recess and the heated presidential campaigns bring the issue front and center for American citizens. So what are the details they need to know?

Sequestration Revisited

Brought about by the 2011 Budget Control Act, which aimed to force to compromise on deficit-reducing measures, sequestration is a built-in measure requiring universal federal budget cuts, which would eliminate roughly 11% of expenditures across-the-board for defense programs. The sequester is slated to kick in as of January 2013 if Congress remains unable to pass a defense authorization bill in the meantime. The prospect includes $487 billion in reductions to planned increases in defense spending over the next decade. Despite the relatively bipartisan nature of the armed service committees historically, political rhetoric within both the executive and legislative branches leads pundits to speculate that a solution is unlikely before the November elections.

Outwardly, the Obama administration, the Senate and House Armed Service committees, DoD officials, and industry leaders have all condemned sequestration. Nonetheless, advances to avoid what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called a “meat ax” approach to defense budget reduction have been seemingly non-existent.

Because the cuts are across the board, defense leaders argue that there is little they can do to plan for reductions since there is no degree of strategic implementation. Furthermore, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Frank Kendall has stipulated that sequestration does not exclude Overseas Contingency Operations budgets including allocations for Afghanistan. This is highly concerning, considering it could potentially render U.S. military operations understaffed, underequipped, or both for the 1.5 – 2 year overlap period between the onset of cuts in January and withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

With so many contrasting accounts of what the cuts will do to the defense apparatus, American voters deserve to be informed about the relevant facts prior to the election. Inconsistent public opinion data from varying sources reveals the importance of neutral framing for an issue that has many implications on the deficit, unemployment, and national security. Citizens’ fervor or disregard through the campaign period could be the difference between a final-hour authorization bill for defense versus the implementation of a measure specifically designed to be archaic because it was not expected to pass into effect.

Relative Weight of Defense Budget

To consider the defense budget objectively, it helps to conceptualize it two ways: proportional to all other U.S. federal expenditures and proportional to foreign nations’ defense expenditures. The figures here can be modified based on how appropriations are divided, but the general picture should provide clarity.

According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the FY2011 defense budget, including roughly $160 billion for overseas contingency operations and small portions of the State Department’s budget for international security assistance, constituted about 1/5 of federal expenditures. Despite the degree of ambiguity associated with calculating an exact defense budget, this general range is widely agreed upon.  Compared with Social Security or Medicare expenditures case-by-case, the defense budget is roughly the same.

However, compared to all so-called “entitlement” programs combined, the DoD budget is in the range of about 1/3 their cumulative size.  Compared to the U.S. budget for diplomacy initiatives abroad – the combined budgets of State and USAID at roughly $52.8 billion – the defense budget is over thirteen times larger. At 20%, DoD and associated international security programs comprise a huge and powerful entity, and systematically “trimming the fat” from its budget seems reasonable under current circumstances.

According to statistics compiled by ASP policy analyst Matthew Wallin on national defense expenditures, the 2010 U.S. defense budget exceeded the combined budgets of its ten closest competitors. The defense spending of potentially adversarial nations including China ($91.5 billion), Iran ($9.1 billion), and North Korea ($8.77 billion) reveals a true lack of international parity. Though most Americans agree that our nation has a degree of responsibility as a world leader to empower a capable and technologically advanced military, the fiscal environment necessitates some exercise of pragmatism in budgetary decisions. Furthermore, the 2012 DoD Strategic Guidance document outlining plans for a smaller and leaner force indicates officials’ expectation to allow gaps in defense expenditures between the U.S. and other nations to slim. As the economic struggles are global, it is likely many other nations will reduce their defense budgets as well.

Recommendations regarding Sequestration

1) Take all necessary measures to avoid sequestration, replacing arbitrary cuts with calculated reductions

Eleven percent cuts to all DoD programs will only weaken the defense apparatus across-the-board. A wiser solution would be to systematically assess which programs are central to evolving U.S. military strategy and objectives, and reduce or eliminate operational or technological programs which have proven ineffective or obsolete. Defense cuts can reduce the deficit without sacrificing effectiveness if pursued for the purpose of a unified national security strategy rather than institutional military branch preferences.

2) In program evaluation, do away with projects associated with “worst case scenarios”

The aforementioned data reveals American expenditures that greatly outpace those of competitors. Realistic assessments will indicate that U.S. armed forces are better trained, better equipped, and generally more adaptable than potential adversaries. Massive nuclear arms stockpiles, huge buildups of conventional ground forces, and other strategies of the past simply do not align with the flexible response capabilities en vogue among defense’s innovators.

3) Foster greater cooperation between the public defense apparatus and industry, beginning by providing industry leaders set budgetary restrictions ASAP

Given that defense industrial corporations operate based on contractual awards from the DoD, their fears over the prospect of sequestration are well-documented. Firms fear that the unanswered prospect of cuts would force them to send layoff notices, which could eventually total up to 1.5 million jobs, beginning around the time of the elections – the legally mandated 60 days prior to when the cuts would take effect. Many industrial leaders are awaiting defense budget cuts, but need to know federal stipulations before they can tailor their products accordingly.

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