Steve Coll on AQ
House Testimony: The Paradoxes of Al Qaeda: Think Tank : The New Yorker
More broadly, with or without success in the pursuit of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the group’s self-isolation should provide a fundamental framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy, particularly in the communications sphere. That policy should be constructed to patiently reinforce Al Qaeda’s political isolation. (The hunt for Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, by Predator drone and otherwise, may have a countervailing effect in the short run, but the effort to finally destroy Al Qaeda’s central leadership is nonetheless essential.) The most effective U.S. approach will be to call attention to Al Qaeda’s depredations and weaknesses, through proxies as much as possible, while taking no action itself that might reconnect Al Qaeda to its former political, financial and recruiting support. Fortunately, in strategic communications, Al Qaeda’s own actions speak most effectively for themselves—the ghoulish spectacle of a young Nigerian “taught” to commit suicide by detonating explosives hidden in his underwear was hardly the image of noble war that Al Qaeda would require to recover its lost standing. American communications matter less, but as with Al Qaeda, actions always provide the clearest and most effective signals, particularly in a media era characterized by nearly infinite numbers of channels. Closing Guantanamo, repudiating torture, reaffirming American constitutional values, engaging constructively with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, affirming the sanctity of civilian life in military conflict, are all examples of specific acts by the Obama Administration—attempted or completed—that by themselves can contribute to a successful strategic communications policy aimed at Al Qaeda’s continued political isolation.
The entire testimony is well worth reading. But these policy recommendations are, I believe, spot on.
The main challenge for the United States is to allow AQ to destroy itself, even in the face of provocation. Our impetus — driven the the policy confluence of neo-conservatives and neo-liberals — to try to actively “fix” everything is perhaps our greatest on-going danger. There are times when less is more, and we are now in a situation where restraint is going to serve American interests better than a crusade to reshape politics around the globe.
Of course, if there is a successful spectacular terrorist attack on U.S. soil, we are almost certain to overreact and as a consequence undermine our own strategic interests. Unfortunately, it is probably beyond the capacity of any American politician to prepare the American public sufficiently to allow for a nuanced response to an attack, so we are in a perilous position where AQ can only prosper if we help them, but where we are also likely to be incapable to not doing so if attacked.
