The Incomplete US Antiproliferation Agenda
Absent from President Obama’s State of the Union address on the 27th of January was any mention of his previous commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is a multilateral agreement between 44 nuclear-capable states that would prohibit all nuclear testing once all 44 sign and ratify it. The United States is a signatory, but a Clinton-era effort to ratify the CTBT resulted in regrettable defeat by a Senate that was sharply divided along partisan lines. The defeat caused a firestorm of criticism at home and abroad.
Perhaps for fear of another defeat (US Senate treaty ratification requires a 67-vote majority), Mr. Obama seems to have shelved the CTBT for now and instead capitalized on renegotiating Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) – a nuclear drawdown agreement with Russia that recently lapsed. Although START I is immensely important, it is only a bilateral agreement that leaves out other major nuclear powers such as China and India. Meanwhile, both are actively increasing the size of their arsenals. China’s nuclear forces increased by 25 percent between 2006 and 2008, according to a 2008 Department of Defense report. The Indian nuclear program also continues to grow, as its sea- and land-based portions are developed. India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but enjoys open support from the United States; in 2008, the US Congress gave final approval for US nuclear cooperation with India.
Ratifying or even attempting to ratify the CTBT may benefit Mr. Obama politically. According to the 2007 Simmons Foundation Report, nearly 55% of respondents in the US support the “elimination of nuclear testing worldwide,” while an additional 30% support “reducing the number of nuclear tests in the world.” Moreover, there is a strong bipartisan consensus on nuclear disarmament that includes prominent republicans like Senator John McCain. Possible Republican obstructionism on CTBT is unlikely to be tolerated or garner support from the American people.
US ratification will put pressure on other states (like China, India, Pakistan, Israel and others) to follow suit. It will provide the diplomatic leverage necessary to take stronger action on rogue proliferators such as Iran and North Korea. The United States possesses enough nuclear know-how (at 1054 detonations it has conducted more tests than any other country) not to need testing ever again. More importantly, a resumption of nuclear tests would completely discredit all of the Obama administration “Nuclear-Free World” rhetoric and would be interpreted abroad as nuclear saber rattling (as were North Korean 2006 and 2009 tests, for example).
Unilateral ratification will not weaken the US position, but will rather strengthen it. There is a great precedent for the success of such “leadership by example” on nuclear testing. When the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin renewed the Gorbachev-era unilateral moratorium on testing in 1991, both the United Kingdom and then the United States soon did the same. In 1996 France and China ceased testing as well.
Scientific American correctly asserts: “…the CTBT would make the world a safer, more secure place for the U.S. than a world without the treaty.” The United States missed a great opportunity in 1999, resulting in a world where North Korea was able to detonate two nuclear bombs without any repercussions. Mr. Obama should make sure that this mistake is corrected soon.
