We must restart our stalled nuclear talks
Financial Times
Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov
Published: October 13 2010
In September the US Senate foreign relations committee voted to support New Start, an important treaty limiting nuclear arms in America and Russia. It was a hopeful step, but sadly politics intervened. The full Senate will not now consider the treaty until after November’s elections, and even then partisan bickering could see delays into 2011. Given that Russia’s Duma is waiting for the Senate, we can now expect delays to a treaty that is in both nations’ interest and will push back the timetable for future nuclear negotiations.
New Start reduces the number of nuclear warheads in both countries, while also boosting the international non-proliferation regime. In signing it Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev bolstered a growing US-Russian partnership. Yet, given these delays, they should now do more. In particular, a number of interim steps can help to maintain momentum.
To begin with, Washington and Moscow should open up new talks on nuclear deterrence. A frank conversation, including a discussion about how missile defence and long-range conventional weapons affect the relationship between both countries, could reveal similarities in thinking. These could, in turn, underpin future negotiations to cut nuclear weapons below even the levels of New Start.
Washington has indicated that it wants limits on tactical nuclear weapons in the next round. Moscow still worries about “non-deployed” strategic warheads, for example those not on ballistic missiles but kept at storage sites. New Start, while a critical step, does not affect either category, limiting only “deployed” strategic warheads. Including both these other categories will allow US-Russian negotiators, for the first time, to address all nuclear weapons. They should also increase transparency by revealing their total numbers of weapons.
The next round of negotiations will be longer and more complex than even those that produced New Start, and such preliminary exchanges would allow both sides to begin moving forward on a number of tough issues. Talks should certainly examine the verification challenges posed by limits on tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic warheads, which may need to include monitoring limits on nuclear warheads kept in storage sites, something the US and Russia have never before had to do.
There is also a real chance for co-operation on missile defence. This has long been a daunting issues on the bilateral agenda, although it has been less contentious since the Obama administration’s alteration of US missile defence plans for Europe. But genuine US-Russian – or, indeed, Nato-Russian – co-operation on this issue could convert a long-time problem issue into one of mutual co-operation.
A starting point could be discussions of how Russia and America would co-operate to protect Europe, including European Russia, from a third-country missile threat. This could also help to address Western concerns on Iran. The US and Russia can also push discussions that began at April’s nuclear security summit, when 40 countries pledged to secure their fissile materials by 2014. By pooling expertise, our nations can develop a “gold standard” which all countries can use to secure their fissile material stocks, and keep them out of the hands of terrorist organisations.
Similar moves can be made on non-proliferation. The US and Russia are already working together to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions and persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. But they could also develop a new joint diplomatic strategy to urge all countries to agree to give the International Atomic Energy Agency expanded powers to monitor and inspect nuclear activities. That would also make it harder for other nuclear “wannabes” to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programmes.
Talking about nuclear weapons remains a delicate topic for both our countries. Neither side’s military is excited, for example, about the intrusive verification measures that they may soon have to face. But by pursuing these ideas the US and Russia can cement their improved relationship, give new impetus to efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, and help build a safer and more secure world – even as we await the ratification of New Start.
Madeleine Albright was US secretary of state 1997-2001. Igor Ivanov was Russian foreign minister 1998-2004. A paper with ideas they submitted to the US and Russian governments is at www. brookings.edu and www.imemo.ru
