Credit: U.S. Department of State
Will the U.S. Succeed in Adding African Countries as Permanent Members to the UN Security Council?
This week, the United Nations General Assembly convenes in New York for the “Summit of the Future” with the outspoken goal of retrofitting the multilateral system to fit the 21st century. In anticipation of the Summit, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced that the U.S. supports the addition of two African nations as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council(UNSC), along with the creation of the first-ever non-permanent seat for a small developing island state(SIDS). Her statements were a reaffirming sequel to President Biden’s 2022 announcement that he would endorse permanent memberships to Germany, Japan and India, as well as countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. If implemented, this would mark a significant step towards the expansion of the Security Council’s relevance in the contemporary world order and help the U.S. regain the trust of the people in Africa. However, the road to two permanent African members involves three main hurdles.
First, an amendment of the UN charter to allow new members into the UNSC requires a majority of two thirds in the General Assembly, which may be challenging. Acquiring a permanent seat, whether or not it is accompanied by veto power, bestows member states with enhanced credibility, continuity, and, crucially, representation and is therefore highly coveted. Latin American and some Asian states might raise objections if they perceive themselves as underrepresented. The African argument for a permanent seat is based on the existing historical injustice following its colonial past, its current vast underrepresentation in the UN decision-making, and gross overrepresentations in the issues the UNSC addresses. Compared to other countries seeking permanent seats, such as India, Japan, and Germany, which face potential deadlock due to their geographical justification and internal opposition within the UN, African nations present a more compelling argument for their inclusion.
Second, the resolution relies on a unanimous vote from the P5 members, which seems impossible. China and Russia are likely to use their veto power to prevent what they may see as dilution of their voice on the council. The U.S. decision to back the proposition can be considered a tradeoff: Democracy is on the decline in Africa, and by reaffirming the power of the United Nations and its democratic values, this could be a way to counter that trend and halt Chinese influence in the global south. Simultaneously, bringing Africa to the table permanently could worsen tensions in the chambers of the Security Council and increase its inefficiencies. China is heavily invested in Africa in terms of economic commitment, and has long claimed to be a leader for the Global South. Voting African countries permanently into the discourse could strengthen its multilateral strategy, but if China feels those countries are not sympathetic enough to its interests, it might opt to scuttle the whole effort. Russia on the other hand, is heavily invested in terms of security measures, wherein multiple states in the Sahel region are increasing their security arrangements with Russia, and numerous African nations have abstained from voting to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The two veto-powers have been active in promoting the voices and narratives of the global south, but the question remains whether their actions will match their rhetoric. As the P5 members have vastly different spheres of influence on the continent, that decision might rely heavily on which African nation is most likely to be voted in as a permanent member.
Third, if the P5 can in fact agree to establish two permanent seats at the table, the African nations then need to settle on which two nations should hold such a position. Member nomination has been a longstanding issue; in September 2004, the UN established a high-level committee to increase the member base of the Security Council, but there was little consensus on which countries. Egypt and Nigeria volunteered, Senegal suggested a two-tiered solution with one Francophone seat and one Anglophone seat, some suggested electing countries on five-year terms as semi-permanent members, and others assumed that South Africa was the obvious choice. The decision today is as uncertain as it was in 2004 and could become a clear point of divergence for the African countries.
By supporting the African nations in their quest for a permanent seat at the table, the U.S. has effectively challenged the willingness of the General Assembly, the “defenders of the global south”, and the African nations themselves to see if they can follow through on their own demands if given the opportunity. Moreover, if the initiative comes to a halt at one of the three hurdles, the U.S. can enjoy a boost in soft power from having made a sincere attempt to elevate voices in the world that other powers would hypocritically seek to muffle.
