World Politics Review: Rethinking the 2002 Iraq War Resolution
Bernard I. Finel
On Oct. 16, 2002, President Bush signed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution into law. But six years later, neither the political left nor the political right has internalized the key lessons we should have learned from the run up to the Iraq War.
Both Sen. Obama and Sen. McCain deserve credit: Obama for his skepticism and opposition to the war in 2002 and 2003, McCain for supporting the Surge which has helped make the decision to invade Iraq marginally less disastrous than it appeared in 2006. But the debate over those two questions this election season has served to obscure the question we ought to have asked ourselves in the first place: What would an effective policy towards Iraq have looked like? It is a question that should also inform our approach towards countries like North Korea and Venezuela that also pose ongoing challenges to American foreign policy.
Let’s go back to 2002. Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein, who had expelled weapons inspectors four years before, in 1998. The United States was maintaining no-fly zones over both northern and southern Iraq, a costly military operation that routinely resulted in threats to American aircraft and retaliation against Iraqi ground installations. The Iraqi people suffered from the effects of a decade of sanctions. To put it simply, the situation was a mess, and a genuine policy challenge. So, what should we have done about it?
In retrospect, it is clear that war was the wrong answer. But if war was the wrong answer, what was the right answer? At the time, some opponents of military intervention argued that Saddam was effectively contained, and suggested, in effect, continuing our existing policies. Clearly, though, that approach was increasingly untenable. Support for the sanctions regime was diminishing internationally, in part due to the mounting evidence of humanitarian suffering it resulted in, but also due to the massive corruption it spawned, particularly within the UN’s “Oil for Food” program. The “no fly” zones, initiated as a short-term solution, were in danger of becoming permanent commitments that would also have very likely sapped support.
In the debate over how to deal with “rogue” regimes or “states of concern” such as Iraq, doing nothing was out of the question. The Bush administration’s chose to cut the Gordian Knot through a policy of regime change that is demonstrably untenable. In fairness, though, despite almost a decade of effort, the Clinton administration was no closer to a solution.
First, the Clinton Administration pulled the United States into a strategic rabbit hole by adopting a broad notion of the United States as the “indispensible nation.” In blurring the distinction between U.S. interests and global policy challenges, the “indispensable nation” rubric turned all problems into American problems. As a result, the United States felt constrained to exert influence on issues where American interests were at best uncertain, minimizing the role of other potential actors.
The United States may well be the world’s leading nation. It may have unique capabilities. But the United States is only “indispensible” on a certain sub-set of global issues. If we recognize that, and use that realization to focus our energies, we will be more effective internationally.
Second, American leaders must learn to better assess the value of time, in two important ways. Primarily, we must determine whether any given challenge is a short-term or long-term concern. In cases of the latter, in particular, we need to make sure we create durable policy institutions with lasting effectiveness. Secondarily, we have to consider as part of our strategic calculations whether time is on our side or on that of our adversaries.
Returning to Iraq in 2002, we failed on both accounts. We disproportionately linked American interests to developments in the country, and we did not realize that time was not on our side in our confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Instead of prolonging it, we should have been seeking ways to liquidate our role in containing the country. This would have been a politically costly course of action domestically. But as a practical matter, our hands-off approach prior to Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was probably a better assessment of our core interests than our post-Gulf War obsession with him.
Every country in the region makes a problematic potential ally. Other than Israel, they are all either authoritarian, support terrorism, use oil as an economic weapon, or engage in massive human rights violations. And even Israel has major strategic liabilities as an ally. Given that basic framework, how can it possibly benefit the United States to unambiguously commit itself to any particular outcome?
While Iraq posed a threat to the region in 2002, so, too, did Iran and the danger of radicalism on the Arabian peninsula. Had we weighed those threats against each other, we might have considered our interests met so long as oil flowed and we were able to get some adherence to non-proliferation.
Both of those goals were achievable once Bush’s threats of force compelled Saddam Hussein to accept the reintroduction of weapons inspectors in November 2002.
The tragedy of the Iraq War was not the resolution authorizing the use of force, but the failure of the Bush administration to recognize that the threat of war had rendered regime change unnecessary. We had already achieved our main national security objectives, and should have taken advantage of the path it opened for a peaceful liquidation of our Iraq commitment in a manner consistent with both U.S. security and international law.
But while the subsequent invasion was no longer necessary, few opponents of the war formulated a workable alternative. Until we develop strategically sound policies that provide plausible alternatives to force, we will not yet have learned the real lesson of the Iraq War.
Bernard I. Finel is a senior fellow at the American Security Project and a former professor of military strategy and operations at the U.S. National War College.
